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PRICELESSNESS AND LIFE: AN ESSAY FOR GUIDO CALABRESI
GREGORY C. KEATING*
At the heart of accident law, Guido Calabresi has long insisted,
lies a tragic conflict of irreconcilable values. Our law of accidents is
profoundly committed both to "the ideal that life is a pearl beyond
price"' and to the practice of valuing people's lives in market terms-
to the practice of pricing life. We know "that not every safety measure
is worth paying for and that some accidents-however horrible-are
'worth having."' 2 We therefore place a price on life, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, and rightly so. We must trade lives off against other goods-
goods as mundane as mere convenience. Placing a price on life en-
ables us to make the necessary exchanges in a rational and systematic
way.
3
This hard and bold lesson surfaces early in the course of Cala-
bresi's remarkable writings, and it blossoms into one of the principal
themes in the finest body of writing on the law of accidents in our
time. The tragic predicament of accident law is a theme in Calabresi's
thinking prior to The Costs of Accidents,4 it figures conspicuously in
* William T. Dalessi Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law School.
I am indebted to Lewis Sargentich for illuminating conversations on the topics of this Essay
over the course of many years; to Ben Zipursky for suggesting this Essay topic to me; to
Don Gifford for organizing the conference; and to the participants in the conference-
especially Hanoch Sheinman, for many illuminating exchanges, and Richard Posner for
commenting graciously on the paper by e-mail. Most of all I am indebted to Guido Cala-
bresi for having written so provocatively on the subject of this Essay over the course of his
career and for commenting on a draft of this paper as well. Portions of this Essay are
adapted, with some changes, from Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of
Cost-Justification, 56 VAND. L. REv. 653 (2003) [hereinafter Pressing Precaution].
1. Guido Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts-The Case of Punitive Damages 10
(Nov. 12, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Complexity].
2. Id.
3. "[T]he decision whether or not to take lives in exchange for money or convenience
is sometimes made.., through the market," by "balancing... the money value of the lives
taken against the money price of the convenience." Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Acci-
dents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REV. 713, 717 (1965) [hereinaf-
ter The Decision for Accidents]. This sentence occurs in the course of Calabresi's first
extended discussion of what he later calls the "myth . . . that our society wants to avoid
accidents at all costs." GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 17 (1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
4. See the extended discussion in Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents, supra note 3, at
716-21. This discussion did not go unnoticed; it was one of the two principal provocations
for Charles Fried's challenge of the economist's perspective on "rational choice in respect
to life and death." Charles Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1415, 1416 & n.2
(1969); see also CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL
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Costs5 itself; and it becomes even more salient in Calabresi' s writing
after Costs.
6
My aim in this Essay is to pay tribute to Calabresi's remarkable
exploration of this conflict between moral conviction and practical ne-
cessity by disagreeing-partially-with him. I shall argue that though
we must indeed trade safety (and with it life) against other goods, the
criteria that we use to make those trades need not be market ones.
The predicament as Calabresi describes it is defined by a conflict be-
tween a moral absolute and a practice modeled on market rationality.
When we conceptualize "the decision for accidents" in market terms,
we conceive of human life as a good that is commensurable with innu-
merable other goods at some ratio of exchange.7 Lives must indeed
be traded off against other goods-as Calabresi has always so force-
fully reminded us-but lives need not be exchanged for other goods
in accordance with the precepts of market rationality.
More particularly, I shall argue that our own law of accidents en-
compasses norms that prescribe especially stringent precaution-
more than efficient precaution-against "significant" risks of acciden-
tal death. These norms require that the risks of some activities be
reduced either to the greatest extent "feasible," or to the point where
the activity can be called "safe." These norms embrace nonmarket
criteria for trading life against other goods and embody a moral value
CHOICE 207-36 (1970). T.C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr. ed., 1968), reprinted in THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 113 (1984) [hereinafter The Life You Save (page cita-
tions to the reprinted version)], was the other provocation for Fried's article. Schelling's
paper formulates the influential distinction between actual and "statistical" lives. That dis-
tinction is implicit in Calabresi's early discussions of our practices with respect to risks of
death.
5. The Costs of Accidents includes the preservation of life "at all costs" as the first of four
"myths" that "will make our analysis difficult if not cleared up." THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS,
supra note 3, at 17.
6. In his writings since The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi has worried especially and elo-
quently about the apparent irrationality of "spend[ing] millions of dollars to save the lives
of clearly identified individuals who are in immediate danger-dollars, which, if applied to
generalized safety, would protect and preserve many more." GuiDo CALABRESI, IDEALS,
BELIEFS, ATITUDES AND THE LAw: PRIVATE LAw PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAw PROBLEM 6
(1985). But see GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BoBBrTr, TRAGIC CHOICES 39 (1978) (stating that
"[t]o the extent that our lives and institutions depend on the notion that life is beyond
price .... a refusal to save lives is horribly costly").
7. "[E]conomics... envisages rational man as seeking many goals, all substitutable at
the margin. On the margin, economic man is prepared to trade off some freedom for
some security, some privacy for some wealth, some freedom for some paternalism, and vice
versa... ." Harold Demsetz, Professor Michelman's Unnecessary and Futile Search for the Philoso-
pher's Touchstone, in NoMos XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAw 41, 44 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982).
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different from the value of efficiency embraced by the market. The
market embodies the idea of efficiency, and efficiency in turn ex-
presses an idea of the greatest good or general welfare. Efficiency is
concerned with "the relationship between the aggregate benefits of a
situation and the aggregate costs of the situation."8 An arrangement
is efficient when it maximizes benefits and minimizes costs-when it
"maximize Es] the size of the pie."9 The pie itself-the value being
maximized-is human well-being or welfare as expressed by persons'
subjective preferences and as measured by the metric of money.10
Goods are measured by their contribution to human welfare and all
goods and all goals are "substitutable at the margin."'" Everything-
from life to convenience-is fungible at some ratio of exchange. Effi-
cient precaution thus licenses sacrificing the lives of some for the con-
venience of others, if the some are few enough and the others
plentiful enough. When the some are few enough and the others
plentiful enough, sacrificing the lives of some maximizes value.
Feasible and safe precaution are animated by the competing
value of interpersonal fairness. They flow from the proposition that
the burdens and benefits of risky activities must be justifiable to those
who are burdened by those activities. Feasible and safe precaution
take safety to be an especially important good-a precondition of a
decent life. They insist that it is unfair to put anyone's urgent interest
in undevastated life at significant peril for the sake of trivial gains to
others. It is fair to put lives in significant danger only when something
comparably valuable stands to be gained, either by those whose lives
are endangered or by others. Feasible and safe precaution reject the
idea that the price system is the proper measure of precaution when
significant risks to life are at stake. They express the "pricelessness" of
life not by demanding-absurdly-that no tradeoffs involving life are
8. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (2d ed. 1989).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribu-
tion in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 368-69 (1991) ("I adopt the consumer
sovereignty position that consumer welfare is to be judged solely by reference to consum-
ers' own tastes and preferences. I also assume that those tastes and preferences can be
meaningfully translated into a dollar amount and that the appropriate amount is whatever
each consumer is willing to pay to satisfy those preferences."). Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell also make these assumptions. See, e.g., Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE 88 n.5 (2002) (indicating that "the importance of liberty to an individual"
should be "determined by the amount by which the individual values it"); id. at 100 n.32
(endorsing "the convention of placing a dollar value on harm" as a way of measuring "the
implicit valuations of individuals reflected in the choices they make"). See also Gregory
Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 334 n.78,
335 n.81 (1996) [hereinafter Reasonableness and Rationality].
11. Demsetz, supra note 7, at 44.
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ever acceptable, but by rejecting the market model ofjustified precau-
tion and insisting that lives be imperiled only for the sake of compara-
bly valuable goods. Just as we show due respect for human dignity by
treating others in accordance with principles of right and justice, 2 so
too we show due respect for the pricelessness of life by sacrificing lives
only in accordance with appropriately stringent principles of
precaution.
Part I of this Essay traces the conflict between ordinary moral in-
tuitions of fairness and economic prescription; it argues that powerful
and coherent ideas of fairness support the ordinary moral intuition
that the norm of cost-justified precaution requires insufficient precau-
tion in cases where death or devastating injury is risked. Part II ex-
plains the safety and feasibility norms found in aspects of federal
statutory risk regulation. Parts III and IV argue that the best interpre-
tation of the safety and feasibility standards shows them to be concep-
tually coherent alternatives to cost-justified precaution. These
standards constructively embody the objections of fairness that under-
lie the ordinary moral intuition that significant risks of death demand
more than cost-justified precaution. Part V grapples with the fact that
the reach of the feasibility norm is limited in a very important way by
the operation of the market. Feasible risk reduction ceases at the
point where further risk reduction would jeopardize the long-run sur-
vival of the activities to which it applies. The value of those activities is
vouched for by the fact that they flourish in our market economy-by
the fact that they are "efficient activities" in some rough and ready
way. This role of the market in limiting the reach of feasible precau-
tion is a powerful challenge to fairness ideals. Part V considers how
this challenge might be met.
I. THE TRAGIC PREDICAMENT OF ACCIDENT LAW
A. Economic Sense and Moral Sensibility
The economic tradition in the law of accidents asserts that justi-
fied precaution is, and ought to be, economically efficient precaution.
When Learned Hand devised his famous "formula" for determining
the amount of care due, Richard Posner argues, he was both "adum-
12. As Rawls notes:
[T]o respect persons is to recognize that they possess an inviolability founded on
justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. It is to affirm
that the loss of freedom for some is not made right by a greater welfare enjoyed
by others. The lexical priorities ofjustice represent the value of persons that Kant
says is beyond all price.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 87, at 513 (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter THEORY].
[VOL. 64:159
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brating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic meaning of negligence,"
and attempting nothing more novel than "to make explicit the stan-
dard that the courts had long applied."13 Judge Hand, as Robert
Cooter and Thomas Ulen explain, "set the legal standard of care by
explicitly balancing the benefits and costs of precaution, just as an
economist would have done."14 So conceived, reasonable care is the
level of precaution that minimizes the combined costs of preventing
and paying for accidents, thereby maximizing the wealth at society's
disposal. Precaution should be taken until a penny more spent to pre-
vent accidents yields less than a penny's reduction in expected acci-
dent costs.
This economic interpretation of due care has been enormously
influential, but it remains deeply problematic. It equates reasonable
care with rational care, and spells rationality out in economic terms.
1 5
The average reasonable person thinks and acts as a single, economi-
cally rational actor would, if she bore both the costs and the benefits
of precaution. An unreasonable person, by contrast, gives more
13. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972) (footnote
omitted). In marked contrast to Posner, Calabresi has been more preoccupied with-and
more favorably disposed toward-strict liability than negligence. Indeed, within the law
and economics movement, Calabresi may be the preeminent critic of negligence liability.
Part IV of The Costs of Accidents, for example, is a systematic indictment of negligence liabil-
ity. Nevertheless, Calabresi's writings suggest a provisional acceptance of an account of
negligence liability along the general lines of the orthodox economic interpretation, even
as those writings argue for the superiority of strict liability as an engine of "primary acci-
dent cost reduction." Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1058 (1972). Calabresi and Hirschoff start with the assumption
"that the traditional test for fault, as given expression in Learned Hand's formula, was
designed to do what Professor Posner says it was designed to do, namely to minimize the
sum of accident costs and the costs of accident avoidance." Id. at 1057 (footnote omitted).
They go on to clarify: "Our assumption, more precisely, is that the object is optimization of
primary accident costs." Id at 1057 n.10 (citing THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 3, at
26-31).
Perhaps more importantly, a market account of the way that we do and should some-
times trade life for convenience and other mundane advantages is one prong of the tragic
predicament of accident law as Calabresi frames it. See, e.g., Calabresi, Complexity, supra
note 1, at 9-11. In the course of explicating the "tragic choice" function of punitive dam-
ages, Calabresi focuses on Ford's decision not to redesign the gas tanks in Ford Pintos
because the company concluded that the cost of such redesign would be "too high ... in
relation to the number of lives that would be saved by doing so." Id. at 9. Calabresi then
asks: "Why, after all, doesn't the Learned Hand test for negligence presume just such a
cost/benefit test?" Id. at 10.
14. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 360 (1988) [hereinafter 1st
ed.]. In the most recent edition of their textbook, Cooter and Ulen take the same posi-
tion, albeit a bit less explicitly. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
314-15 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 3d ed.] (noting that "[r]epeated application of the
Hand rule enables adjudicators to discover the efficient level of care").
15. See Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality, supra note 10, at 325-27, 337-39.
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weight to the benefits she gains by imposing risks on others than to
the costs that her risks impose on others.16 This core claim is at once
a confirmation of our fundamental moral convictions and an affront
to them. It is a confirmation of our moral convictions because-if
anything is unreasonable-assuming that my interests are objectively
more important than other people's interests is unreasonable. From a
truly impartial point of view, my life is only one life among many
equally important lives, and my well-being has no claim to special
importance.'
7
If the economic interpretation captures something fundamental
about the moral point of view when it insists thatjudgments of reason-
able care must count every affected person's interests equally, it af-
fronts our moral sensibility in an equally fundamental way when it
comes to conceptualizing the value of life itself. Cost-benefit analysis
treats all human interests-urgent ones like physical integrity and ad-
equate nutrition, and luxuries like the consumption of fine wines-as
fungible at some ratio of exchange and insists that the cost-justified
level of precaution is the only level of precaution that is ever justi-
fied." Our common law of negligence, by contrast, treats the physical
integrity of the person as an especially urgent interest,19 and our juries
16. Cooter and Ulen note that
reasonableness requires the decisionmaker to give similar weight to the cost of
more precaution, which he bears, and the benefit of more precaution in terms of
the reduced frequency and severity of accidents, which others enjoy. His behavior
is unreasonable and his precaution is faulty when he gives more weight to the
costs he bears than to the benefits it creates for others.
COOTER & ULEN, 1st ed., supra note 14, at 360. This exact passage is not found in the third
edition of the book. However, nothing in the third edition suggests that Cooter and Ulen
have or would repudiate the ideas expressed in the passage.
17. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 437-43 (emphasizing the normative
appeal of the "ex ante perspective" and its importance to the "welfare economic view");
THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 10-1] (1991) (asserting that ethics and political
theory begin from the "impersonal standpoint" and that "the basic insight that appears
from the impersonal standpoint is that everyone's life matters, and no one is more impor-
tant than anyone else"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Should We All Be Welfare Economists?, 101
MICH. L. REv. 979, 1009 (2003) ("As affirmed by a tradition of liberal or 'impartialist'
theories, the foundation of moral thought lies in an 'impersonal standpoint' from which
each of us must recognize that, objectively speaking, we are no more important than any-
one else." (footnote omitted) (citing NAGEL, supra, at 10-11)).
18. E.g., Herman B. Leonard & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to
Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in VALUES AT RISK 31, 35 (Douglas MacClean ed., 1986).
Leonard and Zeckhauser argue that centralized decisions of whether or not to impose a
risk should be made by choosing the "alternative... for which benefits most exceed costs.
This standard is often referred to as 'efficiency.' The underlying notion is that it is wasteful
to choose alternatives that do not provide the maximum possible 'net benefits' or 'sur-
plus.'" Id.
19. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality, supra note 10, at 364-67.
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are repulsed by the claim that accidental deaths should not be pre-
vented whenever the costs of prevention exceed the value-economi-
cally conceived-of the lives at risk.20 According to the folk wisdom of
products liability lawyers:
[O] ne argument that you should almost never make is that
the manufacturer deliberately included a dangerous feature
in the product's design because of the high monetary cost
that the manufacturer would have incurred in choosing an-
other design. If you do argue this, you're almost certain to
lose on liability, and you can expose yourself to punitive
damages as well.21
Jury practice and economic prescription are at odds with one another.
For Calabresi, this conflict between the moral sensibilities of ju-
rors and economic science is a tragic clash of values in Isaiah Berlin's
sense.22 In coping with accidental injury, we cannot abandon either
our commitment to economic rationality or our commitment to the
pricelessness of life. Paradoxically, we must cling to our belief in the
pricelessness of life even though the "first myth" likely to cloud ra-
tional analysis of accidental harm is the myth that our society wants to
avoid accidents at all costs:
Our society is not committed to preserving life at any
cost. In its broadest sense, the rather unpleasant notion that
we are willing to destroy lives should be obvious. Wars are
fought. The University of Mississippi is integrated at the risk
of losing lives. But what is more pertinent to the study of
accident law, though perhaps equally obvious, is that lives are
spent not only when the quid pro quo is some great moral
principle, but also when it is a matter of convenience. Ven-
tures are undertaken that, statistically at least, are certain to
cost lives. Thus we build a tunnel under Mont Blanc because
it is essential to the Common Market and cuts down the trav-
eling time from Rome to Paris, though we know that about
one man per kilometer of tunnel will die. We take planes
and cars rather than safer, slower means of travel. And per-
haps most telling, we use relatively safe equipment rather
20. Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1038
(1991); W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 107, 115-26 (2001).
21. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1038. This lesson is taken to be the moral of the Ford
Pinto case, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
22. See IsAiAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 168 (1969)
("The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with
choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some
of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others.").
2005]
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than the safest imaginable because-and it is not a bad rea-
son-the safest costs too much. It should be apparent that
while some of these accident-causing activities also result in
diminution of accidents-the Mont Blanc tunnel may well
save more lives by diminishing traffic fatalities than it took tobuild it-this explanation does not come close to justifying
most accident-causing activities. Railroad grade crossings are
used because they are cheap, not because they save more
lives than they take.23
We might expect this blunt demonstration that our actual prac-
tice belies our professed belief in the pricelessness of life to be fol-lowed by the equally blunt conclusion that a belief in the pricelessness
of life is so much sentimental silliness. But this is not the conclusion
that Calabresi draws:
The problem is that while we know at some level that
not every safety measure is worth paying for and that some
accidents-however horrible-are "worth having," yet we are
committed to the ideal that life is a pearl beyond price. And
we are determined, as a society, to hold to both contradictory
views. Thus, shortly after I wrote an article provocatively ti-
tled "The Decision for Accidents," the New York Times
thundered in an editorial that when safety is at stake, no
amount of expenditure is too much. I was tempted to write them
welcoming the fact that thereafter all their delivery trucks
would, I supposed, drive no faster than 5 miles an hour. Idid not do so, of course, because I realized that the Times was
saying something important, and in a way true, when it de-
nied the acceptability of safety/cost tradeoffs, just as I was
when I asserted their inevitability.24
This conflict between abstract conviction and actual practice embod-
ies, then, a tragic conflict of values that drives us to a defensible
subterfuge:
We want Ford to make a cost/benefit analysis, and
choose the cheaper way. But-at least in cases as gruesome
as the Pinto one-we certainly don't want to have that analy-
sis thrown in our face. We cannot accept the blatant state-
ment that burning babies is not only something that,
tragically, will occur from time to time, but that Ford was
23. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 3, at 17-18 (footnote omitted). The omittedfootnote directs the reader to "a more complete discussion of this point" in Calabresi, The
Decision for Accidents, supra note 3, at 716-21.
24. Calabresi, Complexity, supra note 1, at 10.
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somehow right in choosing to bring it about, and therefore
should not pay damages. What then is the answer?
At least in cases like the Pinto one, our seeming adher-
ence to a fault standard described in cost/benefit terms is a
false one. We may not, ultimately, object to where Ford put
its gas tanks enough to forbid their doing so. We may not
even think it wrong for Ford to decide on the tank's place-
ment based on a cost/benefit analysis. But we will not let
Ford defend against liability to those killed or injured, by cit-
ing that cost benefit analysis. The cost to us, of being bla-
tantly told what, even if inevitable, is unacceptable, is simply
too high. Despite, then, the supposed applicability of a fault
standard to such situations, we require, in these extreme
cases, that the defendant pay damages, regardless of Learned
Handisms, and shut up! And we enforce this subterfuge-
this actuality of strict liability despite the nominal dominance
of cost/benefit determined fault-by assessing punitive dam-
ages o[n] any defendant foolish enough not to appreciate
our self-contradictory but not irrational rules.
25
For Calabresi, then, the conflict between our need to put lives at risk
in a rational way and our competing need to affirm the sanctity of life
can only be resolved by dissembling.
The burden of this Essay is to suggest that our predicament may
not be quite so grim. The proposition that life has a value beyond all
price might be understood not to forbid all trading off of lives against
other goods, but only to forbid trading lives off in accordance with
market principles of rationality. The market is the price system. The
claim that life is beyond all price may, therefore, be understood not as
a claim that life may never be put at risk in pursuit of some other
value, but as a claim that life should not be traded off against other
goods in accordance with the principles of the market. The market is
a particular, contestable mode of valuation and exchange. The mar-
ket trades goods off against each other in a way that denies that
some-like life-are more valuable than others-like money or con-
venience. When everything is given a price, everything is fungible
with everything else at some ratio of exchange. Yet life is especially
valuable and its protection especially urgent. Morally acceptable prin-
ciples for trading life off against other goods must account for the
special value of life and the special urgency of protecting against
death and devastating injury.
25. Id. at 11. The need for subterfuge is a theme in Calabresi's Tragic Choices as well.
CALABREsi & BOBBIrI, supra note 6, passim.
20051
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I shall argue that our legal system does in fact contain norms that
insist on more than cost-justified precaution against risks of death or
devastating injury, and that these norms are plausibly understood as
appropriate ways to register the special value of life itself and the ur-
gency of its protection. These norms show that there is, extant in our
legal culture, a practical way of expressing the pricelessness of life.
That way consists of acting in accordance with principles of precau-
tion that reject the "pricing" rationality of cost-benefit analysis and
take a restricted view of the goods that are worth pursuing when the
cost is significant risk of devastating injury.2 6 Before we turn to these
norms, however, we must examine the conflict between coherent eco-
nomic science and inchoate moral intuition more closely.
B. Inchoate Intuition and Coherent Science
If the economic interpretation of reasonable care is at odds withjury practice, the claim implicit in jury practice-that precaution
should be pressed beyond the point of cost-justification-is underde-
veloped. The ideal of reasonableness that lies at the heart of negli-
gence law is intrinsically moral-and so eludes reduction to the
morally neutral notion of rationality27
-but because the practice of
negligence adjudication involves jury application of the general legal
standard of reasonable care to particular fact patterns, the norm of
reasonable care has not given rise to conceptually well-defined and
clear alternatives to cost-justified precaution in cases where life itself is
at stake. Jury adjudication yields particular judgments of reasonable-
ness, not conceptual refinement of the norm of reasonable care it-
self.2 8 For their part, scholars of negligence law sympathetic to jury
revulsion towards cost-benefit analysis of risks to life and limb have not
26. It is worth noting that my views can be incorporated within the framework of TheCosts of Accidents in two ways. First, they can be understood as a constraint of justice thatlimits the use of efficiency criteria in a particular context. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS,
supra note 3, at 24 n.1. The Costs of Accidents contemplates this possibility and accepts its
applicability in some range of circumstances. Id. Second, the statutes that I discuss in PartsII and III of this Essay involve the kind of collective valuation of activities that Costs analyzes
under the rubric of "specific" or "collective" deterrence. See generally id. at 95-134.
27. SeeJOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 48-49 n.1, 48-54 (1993) [hereinafter POLITI-
cAL LIBERALISM]; W.M. Sibley, The Rational Versus the Reasonable, 62 PHIL. REv. 554 (1953);
see also Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality, supra note 10, at 311-12 ("When we act ra-
tionally, we pursue our self-interest in an instrumentally intelligent way. When we act rea-
sonably, we restrain our pursuit of self-interest by acting in accordance with principles thatfix fair terms of cooperation."). Reasonableness requires that we take the impact of ourproposed actions on others as a circumstance capable of affecting our conduct and seek to
act on a basis acceptable to those we affect.
28. Reasonable care is sometimes given precise form in rules through the adoption of
customarily or statutorily prescribed precautions, but this enterprise does not generate
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explained why more than cost-justified precaution might indeed be
appropriate when life itself is threatened with severe and irreparable
injury. Nor have they explained just how much more precaution is
appropriate.
Economically inclined tort scholars, by contrast, have clear and
well-articulated objections to taking more than cost-justified precau-
tion. Cost-justified precaution is efficient precaution. Economically
speaking, it is irrational to take more than efficient precaution; it
shrinks the pie instead of expanding it. Precautions taken once the
point of cost-justified precaution has been reached yield less in dollars
saved than they cost in dollars spent. We would thus be richer if we
chose not to take the extra precautions demanded by the safety and
feasibility norms. Therefore, insofar as they insist on taking more
than efficient precaution, feasible precaution and safe precaution
make us worse off, not better off.29 Our welfare could be improved by
retreating back to the point of cost-justified precaution and by putting
the money saved to better use elsewhere. Why, then, should society
ever press precaution beyond the point of cost-justification?
One answer-and there may be others-lies in considerations of
fairness and urgency. The idea of fairness directs our attention to a
distinct domain of concerns, a domain different from that of either
efficiency or rights. Fairness is concerned with the distribution of bur-
dens and benefits-"with how well each person's claim is satisfied com-
pared with how well other people's are satisfied."
' Treating people
fairly generally requires us to align burden and benefit proportionally
much in the way of the conceptual refinement or specification of the 
idea of
reasonableness.
29. The claim that it is wasteful and irrational to take more than cost-justified precau-
tion is fundamental to the economic analysis of risk and precaution. Leonard 
&
Zeckhauser, supra note 18, at 35; see also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 52 (arguing
that "individuals will be made worse off overall whenever consideration of fairness leads 
to
the choice of a regime different from that which would be adopted under welfare econom-
ics"); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Economic Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy, in CHOICE AND CON-
SEQUENCE, supra note 4, at 1, 15-17 (explaining that "'not efficient' merely means that I can
think of something better-something potentially better from the points of view 
of all
parties concerned").
30. John Broome, Fairness, 91 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SoC'Y 87, 94-95 (1990-91).
Fairness does not, therefore, represent a way in which people are made better off. 
Explain-
ing just why considerations of fairness may still have priority over considerations of well-
being is thus an important challenge, as Louis Kaplow and Steve Shavell rightly insist. 
See
generally KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 10. A complete response to Professors Kaplow 
and
Shavell is beyond the scope of this paper. A brief comment, however, is in order: Circum-
stances where risks of physical injury inevitably result in some death or devastating injury
are circumstances where the well-being of some is increased by the imposition of the risks
in question and the well-being of others is decreased very greatly. Considerations 
of fair-
ness-of who wins and how great are their gains, and who loses and how great are their
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and to treat competing claims in ways that can be justified to those
whose claims they are. 31 Because fairness is concerned with compet-
ing claims, it brings issues of urgency to the fore. When we must de-
cide if the burdens to one person (or class of persons) are justified by
benefits to another person (or class of persons) we are pressed to-
wards employing "objective," urgency-based criteria of interpersonal
comparison.32 We are pushed not towards asking how intensely the
affected persons desire the benefits-or loathe the burdens-at issue,
but how urgent the harms done and the gains won are. When people
complain that it is unfair for some to live in the lap of luxury while
others go hungry and sleep beneath bridges, they are not asserting
that those who live in the lap of luxury do not prize their pleasures.
They are asserting that adequate food and shelter are more urgent
needs. Protection against irreparable injury and death are similarly
urgent needs.
Efficiency, by contrast, directs our attention to questions of indi-
vidual welfare or well-being. It is natural to measure a person's wel-
fare or well-being by asking how well that person's life is going from
his or her point of view. This is what efficiency analysis tries to do by
taking preference satisfaction as its basic measure of welfare. Risk of
accidental death-the most severe case of the sort of irreparable in-jury that concerns us-presents efficiency analysis with an especially
difficult exercise in determining other people's preferences. "What is
it worth," Thomas Schelling asks, "to reduce the probability of death
... within some identifiable group of people none of whom expects to
die except eventually?"3 3 What is it worth, in other words, to save a
"statistical life"-a life that will be saved not here, now and vividly, but
later and invisibly? The answer hinges, Schelling argues, on the value
losses-therefore come to the fore while considerations of overall well-being recede into
the background.
31. The first point is as old as Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, NIcoMACHEAN ETHICS 87 (RogerCrisp ed. & trans., 2000) ("[W]hat is just... is what is proportionate ...."). The second isbrought out by the "Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness." RAWLS, THEORY, supra
note 12, § 40, at 221; see id. § 4, at 15-19 (discussing the problem of "justification").
32. See T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72J. PHIL. 655, 656-59 (1975) [hereinafterUrgency] (contrasting "objective" and "subjective" criteria of interpersonal comparison).
Subjective criteria, Scanlon writes, evaluate "the level of well-being enjoyed by a person ingiven material circumstances or the importance for that person of a given benefit or sacri-fice . . .solely from the point of view of that person's tastes and interests." Id. at 656.
Objective criteria "provide[ ] a basis for appraisal of a person's level of well-being which is
independent of that person's tastes and interests." Id. at 658.
33. SCHELLING, The Life You Save, supra note 4, at 113. When it was first published in1968, Schelling's article inaugurated the modem economic approach to the valuation of
human life.
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that the affected individuals themselves place on their lives.
4 Con-
ceptually, what is required is not a moral judgment but a "consumer
choice."3 5 We need to determine how highly people value life and
safety in comparison with the many other objectives that they seek, all
of which are substitutable at the margin. Operationally, what is re-
quired is a way of mimicking the market-a way of pricing lives and
safety so that they may be rationally traded off against the other goals
with which they compete. This is the role of cost-benefit analysis.
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Subjecting Risk to the Metric of the Market.-
In its orthodox form, cost-benefit analysis is an attempt to extend a
market mode of valuation and choice to areas where actual markets
fail-where actual markets either do not exist or are incomplete and
imperfect.3 6 Risks to life and limb are a classic case in point.
3 7 Be-
cause it seeks to mimic the market, cost-benefit analysis is constructed
around three criteria of economic efficiency: Pareto optimality,
Pareto improvement, and potential Pareto improvement. A state of
affairs is Pareto optimal (or Pareto efficient) if and only if all opportu-
nities for improving the welfare of any person without making any
34. Id.
35. Id. at 114.
36. Cost-benefit analysis comes in a wide variety of forms. At one end of the spectrum,
cost-benefit analysis is cast as a matter of common sense; at the other end it is recon-
structed as an element of "deliberative democracy." See Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit
Analysis So Controversial?, 29J. LEGAL STUD. 913, 913 (2000) (noting that many find it "hard
to imagine" that anyone could disagree with the "commonsensical" principle that we
should take only those actions whose benefits exceed their costs); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK
AND REASON: SAFETY, LAw AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7-8 (2002) (recasting cost-benefit analysis
so that it has an important role in deliberative democracy).
This Essay describes a particular variant of cost-benefit analysis. I believe that it is fair
to label this variant "orthodox" cost-benefit analysis and that it defines a distinct and im-
portant position. The version that I describe is along the lines of the Kaldor-Hicks version
that Posner finds implicit in the Hand Formula. Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1154
(2000) [hereinafter Cost-Benefit Analysis]. On the one hand, this version is not mere com-
mon sense; it applies the distinctively counterintuitive ideas of economics to a domain
where actual markets do not exist. On the other hand, it is not a practice of deliberation
either. Orthodox cost-benefit analysis does not model a deliberative process for a number
or reasons. For one thing it takes the market idea of consumer choice as its guiding ideal,
and the market is not a deliberative institution. It is a forum in which people act on their
wants or preferences insofar as they are prepared to back those preferences with money.
More particularly, preferences are the upshot of deliberation, not an aspect of delibera-
tion. Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29J. LEGAL STUD. 971,
977 (2000).
37. Calabresi comments eloquently on this in THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 3, at
205-08.
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other person worse off have been exhausted. 8 A policy effects a
Pareto improvement if and only if it makes at least one person better
off without making anyone worse off. 9 A policy makes a potential
Pareto improvement if and only if it produces gains that could be
redistributed to make an actual Pareto improvement. 40 When cost-
benefit analysis seeks the "alternative. . . for which benefits most ex-
ceed costs," it is searching for the alternative that maximizes potential
Pareto improvements.41
Pareto optimality and Pareto improvement are "ordinal" concep-
tions of utility: they rank states of affairs without relying on "any inten-
sity of preference [or] interpersonal comparison of utilities."42 Butjudgments of potential Pareto superiority require determining if those
who stand to win from a proposed change will benefit so greatly that
they can compensate those who stand to lose.43 Judgments of poten-
tial Pareto superiority therefore require some metric by which to mea-
sure gains and losses, in order to determine if gains exceed losses
enough for the winners to compensate the losers and still improve
their lots. The metric employed by cost-benefit analysis is money.
More exactly, cost-benefit analysis typically measures a person's wel-
38. B. Lockwood, Pareto Efficiency, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DicrioNARY OF ECONOMICS
811, 811 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1998) ("[A]n allocation of resources in the economy [isPareto] optimal if there exist[s] no other productively feasible allocation which ma[kes] all
individuals in the economy at least as well-off, and at least one strictly better off, than they
were initially."). On the influence of this concept, see id. ("Simple and limited idea
though this is, it has had an enormous influence on the development of neoclassical eco-
nomics.... It is no exaggeration to say that the entire modern microeconomic theory of
government policy intervention in the economy (including cost-benefit analysis) is predi-
cated on this idea."). In Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further,
100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1212 (1991), Calabresi argues that "any given society is always or will
immediately arrive at a Pareto optimal point given transaction costs." To the extent that
cost-benefit analysis survives-as opposed to merely ignores-Calabresi's claim, it does soby shifting to potential Pareto superiority as its criterion of (in our case) justified risk impo-
sition. As Calabresi argues, however, potential Pareto superiority does not have the same
uncontroversial appeal as true Pareto superiority, even though use of the potential Pareto-
superiority criterion may enable courts to make arguably "efficient" changes from the sta-
tus quo (because courts may be able to impose potentially Pareto-superior changes at suffi-
ciently low transaction costs). The potential Pareto-superiority criterion cannot claim either
the kind of unanimous consent that actual Pareto superiority can claim, or to avoid contro-
versial distributional consequences. See id. at 1221-23.
39. COOTER & ULEN, 3d ed., supra note 14, at 44.
40. Potential Pareto superiority is the same as satisfaction of the Kaldor-Hicks test, id.;hence the compatibility of the model of cost-benefit analysis I sketch in the text with the
form that Posner finds implicit in the Hand Formula. See Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra
note 36, at 1154.
41. Leonard & Zeckhauser, supra note 18, at 35.
42. Lockwood, supra note 38, at 811.
43. COOTER & ULEN, 3d ed., supra note 14, at 44.
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fare as it is affected by some proposed "policy"44 by the maximum
amount that she is either prepared to pay to implement a policy that
she favors, or by the minimum amount she will accept to tolerate a
policy whose implementation she opposes.
4 5
Conceptually, then, determining how great a risk of accidental
premature death or devastating injury is acceptable entails comparing
what the potential victim whose life is at risk would have to be paid to
accept that risk with what the potential injurer who benefits from the
imposition of the relevant risk would pay to impose that risk.4 6 If a
prospective injurer is prepared to pay more to impose a risk than a
prospective victim is prepared to pay to avoid it, then value in the
form of wealth is maximized by imposing the risk. Conceptually, the
victim's life-or, more exactly, that fraction of her life that is exposed
to the risk-is an economic resource, properly traded on the market
and properly purchased by the highest bidder. If a potential injurer
values her expected gain from a risk imposition more highly than a
potential victim values the danger to her life that is the expected cost
of risk imposition," imposing the risk adds economic value even if it
ends up consuming the victim's life. Letting potential injurers and
potential victims alike bid for the safety of the potential victim's life
ensures that her life will be put to its highest use.
44. "Policy" is a term of art here. For present purposes the point is that it covers pro-
posed risk impositions.
45. "Willingness to pay" and "willingness to accept" measures often diverge because
people typically demand more to accept a "policy" they dislike than they are willing to pay
to bring about a policy that they approve. Note, too, that willingness to pay is constrained
by income, whereas willingness to accept is not.
46. This is a representative statement of how cost-benefit analysis proceeds, not a ca-
nonical one. An influential strand of cost-benefit analysis approaches the problem of valu-
ing risks of death in a slightly different way: it seeks to extract from market choices of
occupation and consumption the "implicit" value (or values) that people place on their
own lives. Wage differentials between more and less dangerous jobs, for example, are
often used as a source for deriving implicit valuation-of-life figures. The presumption that
rational people should pay the same amount to avoid a given risk, independent of the
particular context within which it occurs, gives rise to the conclusion that rational implicit
value-of-life figures will be stable across contexts. With a stable implicit valuation in hand,
an analyst can generate a dollar figure for the value of avoiding a determinate statistical
probability of losing a life. This approach is generally traced to SCHELLING, The Life You
Save, supra note 4. Kip Viscusi is the most prominent contemporary practitioner of this
methodology. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILI-
TIES FOR RISKS (1992). The appeal of this particular methodology to tort lawyers is plain:
credible value-of-life figures could be plugged into the Hand formula to determine when
risks of death may reasonably be imposed.
47. In a simple case where death and death alone is risked, the danger to the victim's




2. Fairness: From Inchoate Intuition to Informing Principle.-It is not
hard to put one's finger on a powerful source of moral aversion to
cost-benefit analysis of risks of death. Cost-benefit analysis repudiates
Kant's famous dictum that the value of persons is beyond all price in
the most direct way imaginable." By holding that we act rationally
and value appropriately when we model our decisions regarding risks
of death on the workings of the price system, cost-benefit analysis
treats life like an ordinary commodity available to the highest bidder
and fungible with an all but infinite number of alternative goods. Our
moral intuition insists, with Kant, that if anything is irreplaceable-if
anything is not fungible with all other goods at some ratio of ex-
change-life is irreplaceable. Life has a dignity and not a price, and
we must put it at risk only in ways that respect its dignity. As powerful
as this intuition is, its proper articulation into a coherent moral con-
ception, and its proper expression in principles of precaution, are not
easy tasks.
The articulation of the practical significance of the pricelessness
of life begins with the recognition that the problem we are con-
fronting is a matter of collective choice, and irreducibly so. The issue
is irreducibly collective in part because the questions at the heart of
accident law are intrinsically social. The questions-When may peo-
ple justifiably impose risks of premature death and devastating injury
upon one another? What gains to some justify putting the lives of
others at significant risk?-are questions about what people may do to
one another, of the use that they make of each other's lives. But the
questions at the heart of accident law are also inescapably collective
because they are questions about law-about the protections that
some people may legally demand from others and the freedoms those
others may in their turn insist on as a matter of legal right.
Questions concerning the assignment of legal rights and duties
implicate each of us and all of us, because we are all bound to respect
each other's rights and liberties. Legally recognized slavery is not just
a private contract between two consenting parties. Legally recognized
slavery requires each and every member of society to acknowledge the
legal import of the contract between master and slave, and to affirm
the slave's status as a piece of property. A slave society requires each
and every one of its members to reject the slave's claims to treatment
48. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, reprinted in H.J. PA-
TON, THE MORAL LAW 51, 96 (1948). Kant writes: "In the kingdom of ends everything has
either a price or a dignity. If it has a price, something else can be put in its place as an




as a human being and to acknowledge the slave owner's claim to rec-
ognize ownership of another person as property. Legally recognized
slavery implicates every member of a slave society in the wrong of con-
verting a human being into a thing.49 Principles of risk regulation
likewise implicate all of us. They determine what perils we may im-
pose on others and must bear ourselves, and they require us to ac-
knowledge the rights of third persons to put each other at risk in
various ways. Principles of risk regulation that treat human life as a
fungible commodity, commensurable with all other commodities at
an appropriate rate of exchange, require us all to recognize that we
may treat each other and be treated by each other as mere things.
The problem of accidental injury is intrinsically social and ines-
capably moral for other reasons as well. Accidents are inherently so-
cial because they normally arise in the course of activities that are
normally both net and mutually beneficial. Driving is a classic case in
point. The problem of accidental harm is intrinsically moral because
accidental injuries involve circumstances where some come to grief at
the hands of others. This relationship of doing by some and suffering
by others has "simply as such, an ethical significance. 50 Injurers do
not consume-or do not only consume-their own lives; they take the
lives of others as well. In the case of risks of devastating injury, this
fact is particularly stark. Some reap the rewards of risks of death and
irreparable injury; others are killed and crippled. The fundamental
questions raised by such risks, therefore, are questions of fairness and
49. As Samuel Freeman notes:
Alienation of basic rights, if politically recognized, imposes duties not just upon
the transferor, but also upon society and its members to respect and uphold such
transactions. We are called upon to ignore the moral fate and political status of
others as equals and to participate in their civic and moral debasement .... By
embracing alienation agreements as matters of enforceable public right, we ac-
cept a mandate to coerce and harm certain people against their will, and to re-
spond to them as if they were things.
Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. &
PUB. An'. 105, 112 (2002). This is not to say that particular accident law norms ought to be
matters of inalienable basic right; it is to say that the choice of legally enforceable accident
law norms is a matter of general public concern because these norms determine how we
must and may treat other people.
50. Martin Stone, On the Idea of Private Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 235, 259
(1996); see also id. ("[T]he situation in which one person suffers through the doing of
another... has a natural saliency for human beings. It is bound to figure in the most basic
thinking about what sorts of happenings can be controlled, and related to this, it produces
such natural psychological responses as resentment and revenge."). See generally Martin
Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAw OF TORTS 131
(GeraldJ. Postema ed., 2001).
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valuation:5" What kinds of gains to some are valuable enough to jus-
tify inflicting accidental death on others? What kinds of precaution
may those endangered reasonably insist upon in light of the urgency
of their claim to undevastated life?
In its unrestricted and most characteristic form, cost-benefit anal-
ysis gives a distinctive and disturbing answer to these questions of valu-
ation and interpersonal comparison. It assumes that all burdens and
benefits are fungible at some ratio of exchange52 so that a sufficient
quantity of any benefit will suffice to justify the infliction of devastating
injury, no matter how trivial that benefit may be qualitatively speaking.
Suppose, for example, that a piece of transmitting equipment has top-
pled and crushed a television technician helping to broadcast an epi-
sode of "Baywatch" to a billion viewers worldwide,53 and that the only
way to save the technician's life is to interrupt the broadcast for thirty
minutes, effectively thwarting the transmission of the show on this par-
ticular evening. Unrestricted cost-benefit analysis holds that, if
enough people stand to be disappointed by the termination of a tele-
vision show, terminating the life of a television technician may be pref-
erable to terminating the broadcast of the show. The net benefit to all
of the viewers may exceed the net loss to the technician.
Our moral sensibility balks at this conclusion. Although the num-
ber of viewers may be vast, the harm to them is not comparable to the
life of the technician. Inconvenience and disappointment are not
morally comparable to death. No amount of inconvenience distributed
across a large number of distinct persons sums to the loss of a single life.
51. In an e-mail commentary on a draft of this Essay, Judge Posner remarked: "It
seems to me the question should be whether [the statutory standards I discuss later in this
Essay] make us better off or worse off in some sense, not whether they conform to some
abstract sense of fairness." E-mail from Judge Richard A. Posner (Aug. 5, 2004) (on file
with author). Much is at issue in this line of criticism and I cannot respond to all of it in
this paper. As a beginning, however, it is worth observing that those devastated by acciden-
tal injury are made worse off whereas those who reap the gains of the risks that result in
those injuries are made better off. It is not possible to make "us"-that is, everyone af-
fected by the risks-better off. It is precisely because some will be made better off and
others will be made worse off that questions of fairness are so pressing in this context. For
different reasons, the questions raised by accidental risk impositions are not fundamentally
questions about the rights people should have, ta-.ing rights to identify domains where
persons may do as they please, free from interference by others. For discussion of this
point, see Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 0, at 668-69.
52. Supra note 11 and accompanying text.
53. I adapt this example from T.M. Scanlon. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO
EACH OTHER 235 (1998) [hereinafter WHAT WE OWE] (using the World Cup soccer tourna-
ment as an example). Nothing in the example hinges on the "low cultural value" of




We therefore should not decide how to proceed by measuring the
victim's preference for having her life saved in dollars and by compar-
ing that sum to the price that the viewers would pay to have the broad-
cast continue. The cost to the technician and the benefit to the
viewers are not substitutable at some ratio of exchange.
Death, or even devastation, is not essential to this example. The
harms involved would not be comparable even if the harm to the tech-
nician were not death, or even devastation as I have defined it, but
severe injury-thirty minutes of excruciating pain that left no long-
term physical traces, for example. 54 The gains and losses on the oppo-
site sides of the equation-the inconvenience and disappointment of
missing a favorite television show on the one side and suffering thirty
minutes of excruciating pain on the other-are still not comparable
in the havoc they wreak in the lives of those they affect. They are not
comparable in their urgency. 5 No amount of viewer disappointment
and inconvenience-no number of disappointed and inconvenienced
spectators-can justify letting the technician suffer thirty minutes of
excruciating pain, much less die. Matters would be different only if
the harms on either side of the equation were comparable-if we
were somehow forced to choose between inflicting death on some and
quadriplegia on others, for example. Quadriplegia and death are
comparable to one another. Both devastate the lives of those they
affect. If we must choose between risking quadriplegia to some and
death to others, we must consider the number of persons affected.
54. Scanlon's World Cup fact pattern involved the risk of prolonged pain, not death.
Id.
55. The argument of fairness advanced here rests not on ideas of preference but on
ideas of urgency, or need. T.M. Scanlon writes that interpersonal comparisons based on
considerations of urgency represent "the best available standard ofjustification that is mu-
tually acceptable to people whose preferences diverge." Scanlon, Urgency, supra note 32, at
668; see also Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons, in INTERPER-
SONAL COMPAISONS OF WELL-BEING 17 (Jon Elster &John E. Roemer eds., 1991). In these
papers Scanlon characterizes urgency- or need-based approaches to interpersonal compari-
son as "objective" (in contrast to "subjective") approaches. In a later paper, Scanlon char-
acterizes urgency-based approaches to interpersonal comparison as one kind of
"substantive goods" approach. See Thomas Scanlon, Value, Desire and Quality of Life, in THE
QUALITY OF LIFE 185 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). For our purposes, the
contrast between urgency and preference-based approaches can be understood in either
way. John Rawls's idea of "primary goods" and Amartya Sen's idea of "capabilities" are
examples of approaches to interpersonal comparison that take fundamental needs or in-
terests as the proper basis of comparison. See RAwta, POLITICAL LIBERAisM, supra note 27,
at 187-90 (arguing that the "practical nature of primary goods" makes possible "a public
understanding... concerning what is to be counted as advantageous in matters of political
justice"); AmARTryA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 49 (1992) (noting that "capability repre-
sents a person's freedom to achieve well-being").
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These intuitive judgments of comparability reflect a general idea.
Harms are comparable when they disrupt the lives of those they affect
in similarly urgent (or similarly insignificant) ways, when they strike at
the preconditions of rational agency in similarly severe (or similarly
mild) ways. Burdens and benefits are comparable when they improve
or impair lives in similarly important or modest ways. When burdens
and benefits are comparable, they may, other things being equal, be
traded off against one another. When they are not comparable it is
unfair-unjust-to trade them off against one another. Trading
grave injuries for trivial benefits sacrifices the essential interests of
some for the sake of inessential gains by others. Justice forbids this
kind of sacrifice.
Thus, when risks of death or severe irreparable injury are at issue,
the idea of efficient precaution is fatally flawed in two ways. First, the
existence of discontinuities of value-the fact that not everything is
comparable in value to undevastated human life-requires us to reject
the premise of universal fungibility. Second, the distribution of bur-
den and benefit among affected persons is of far greater moral signifi-
cance than the overall sum of burden and benefit.56 Not everything is
morally comparable to death and devastating injury, in part because
what counts morally is not the total sum of burden and benefit but the
actual distribution of burdens and benefits among affected persons.
When significant risks of physical injury ripen into death and incur-
able disease, the benefits of going beyond the cost-justified level of
precaution are measured in terms of lives saved and incurable diseases
avoided. To those who reap them, these are invaluable benefits. The
distributed costs of going beyond the cost-justified point of precaution,
by contrast, may well be small-perhaps very small-losses to large
numbers of people.57
56. This perception played an important role in the genesis of feasible risk regulation
as practiced by OSHA. See ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1255-57 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 4th ed.]. The text quotes testimony by Dr.
Nicholas Ashford of MIT at OSHA hearings on the agency's cancer policy. In part, that
testimony states:
The most serious limitation (of cost-benefit analysis), however, lies in the failure
to successfully deal with the fact that costs and benefit streams accrue to different
parties. One person's benefit cannot be neatly traded off from another's cost.
Id. at 1256 (citing Identification, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational
Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5001, 5249 (Jan. 22, 1980)). The subsequently adopted OSH1A
cancer policy goes on to state that "equity considerations" are "paramount to occupational
health regulation." Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Potential Occupa-
tional Carcinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. at 5250.
57. My point is parallel to a familiar objection to maximizing total utility. Maximizing
total utility is misguided even if one accepts utility as the appropriate unit of value, because
[VOL. 64:159
2005] PRICELESSNESS AND LIFE
Put differently, the point is that sacrificing an urgent interest-
the interest in avoiding premature death or devastating injury-for
the sake of trivial gains to others, cannot be justified to those whose
urgent interests are sacrificed. It is only fair to ask some people to
bear a significant risk of devastating injury when the burden of elimi-
nating that risk is comparable to the burden of bearing it.
The flaws in the economic argument that it is irrational to press
precaution beyond the point of cost-justification-because doing so
will make everyone worse off5 -should now be apparent. When at-
tention to the net balance of costs and benefits licenses a level of risk
imposition that devastates some for the sake of trivial gains to others,
irreparable injustice (as well as irreparable harm) is done. Redistribu-
tion of the wealth saved by taking only efficient precaution will not
make those who have been killed and devastated better off than they
would have been had their death and devastation been avoided.59
They have been harmed beyond the power of redistribution to repair.
When attention to overall welfare as measured in wealth authorizes a
level of risk imposition that devastates some for the sake of trivial
gains to others, some have been made much worse off for the sake of
minor gains to others.6" Because well-being accrues to actual persons,
what counts is the utility experienced by each sentient being and total utility is experienced
by no one. As Rawls argues:
[Wlhen population is subject to change [the principle of maximizing total utility]
entails that so long as the average utility per person falls slowly enough when the
number of individuals increases, the population should be encouraged to grow
indefinitely no matter how low the average has fallen .... [T]he sum of utilities
added by the greater number of persons is sufficiently great to make up for the
decline in the share per capita. As a matter ofjustice .... a very low average level
of well-being may be required.
RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 12, § 27, at 140. Maximizing wealth-the practice recom-
mended by cost-benefit analysis-is misguided for the same reason. No single person
reaps all of the benefits and bears all of the burdens of any social practice. The sum of
those benefits minus those burdens is therefore an unreliable guide to the actual gains and
losses of the persons affected by the practice.
58. Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
59. Louis Kaplow and Steve Shavell have developed in great detail the claim that effi-
cient precaution always makes everyone better off. They argue that efficiency should be
the norm for all bodies of law, except for tax law, which may rightly pursue redistributive
measures to promote welfare. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 52 (arguing
that "satisfying notions of fairness can make individuals worse off"); id. at 33-34 (on taxes as
a redistributive measure). My objection here to this kind of argument is narrow. Redistri-
bution cannot repair the harm done by irreparable injury.
60. I suspect that Kaplow and Shavell's denial of this rests on a conflation of ex ante
advantage with actual well-being. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 436-49 (defend-
ing the ex ante perspective). When the repeated imposition of ajustified risk is certain to
result in at least one person's death, it is impossible to make "everyone better off." The
person who dies is not made better off by his own untimely death. Risk impositions that
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pressing precaution beyond the point of cost-justification will confer
great benefits on some at the cost of trivial losses to others. Each per-
son who benefits will gain far more than each person who loses.
When taking more than efficient precaution spares some from death
or devastation at the cost of only small losses to many others, taking
more than efficient precaution is not only fair, it is also desirable inso-
far as well-being itself is of primary concern.
Our law of accidents is not insensitive to the fact that the require-
ment of comparable value-coupled with appropriate attention to the
actual distribution of burden and benefit-gives us good reason to
move beyond the point of cost-justified precaution. Federal statutory
risk regulation, for example, requires that some risks of death or se-
vere, irreparable injury be reduced either to the safe level or to the
feasible level.61 In our terms, reducing risks of devastating injury to
the point where they are "insignificant"-the demand of safety-based
regulation-is justified when the benefits of an activity are not compa-
rable, morally speaking, to the burden of bearing a significant risk of
devastating injury. Reducing risks of devastating injury to the extent
feasible without crippling the beneficial activity that generates the
risks-the demand of feasibility analysis-is justified when crippling
the activity in question would work a harm comparable to bearing a
significant risk of devastating injury. Reducing risks only so far as fea-
sible is fair when the long-run flourishing of the activity that gives rise
to the risks in question is a good morally comparable to a significant
risk of devastating injury.
To develop this argument we must first examine the relevant le-
gal standards.
II. COST-JUSTIFIED, FEASIBLE, AND SAFE PRECAUTION
In comparison with negligence law's notion of reasonable risk im-
position-a notion that is enormously rich, but also susceptible to a
variety of plausible interpretations-the cost-justified, feasible, and
result in death can be to the ex ante advantage of those they kill, but they do not make
those they kill "better off." Ex ante advantage and actual well-being are different matters.
SeeJohn Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9J. PuB. ECON. 91, 95 (1978) (proclaiming ex ante
valuation to be worthless when a risk results in death).
61. "Cost-justified," "feasible," and "safe" precaution are the three standards of precau-
tion discussed in the next Part. In general, cost-justified precaution is less protective of
safety than feasible precaution, and feasible precaution is less protective than safe precau-
tion is-but not always. Feasible precaution will be less protective of safety than cost-justi-
fied precaution when it is not cost-justified to engage in an activity in the first place.
[VOL. 64:159
PRICELESSNESS AND LIFE
safe standards of acceptable risk imposition are well defined.6 2 They
identify distinct levels of permissible risk imposition, and they stand in
linear, vertical relation to one another:
6 3
Cost-justified risk reduction. Among these three standards, the
cost-justification standard tolerates the most risk. Costs and
benefits are aggregated, with the aim of minimizing the costs
of paying for and preventing accidents, thereby maximizing
the benefits extracted from the risky activity at issue. Cost-
benefit analysis requires risks to be reduced to the point
where the costs of further precautions exceed their benefits.
If the marginal costs of eliminating significant risks exceed
the marginal benefits, significant risks will continue to exist.
Feasible risk reduction. The feasibility standard tolerates less
risk. Feasibility analysis looks to achieve the lowest level of
risk practically attainable, not the level of risk that minimizes
the combined costs of injuries and their prevention. Feasi-
bility analysis requires the elimination of "significant" risks,
when they can be eliminated without threatening the long-
run health of the activity to which the risks belong. Signifi-
cant cost-justified risks are eliminated so long as their elimi-
nation is compatible with the long-term flourishing of the
activity at issue. Significant risks remain only if their elimina-
tion would threaten the survival of the activity.
Safe level of risk imposition. The safe-level standard tolerates
the least risk. Safety-based regulations require risk to be re-
duced to a point where no significant risk of devastating in-
jury remains. Applying the safe-level standard therefore does
not require any inquiry into the costs of risk reduction. All
that it requires is a determination of the level at which the
risk created by exposure to the regulated substance ceases to
be significant.
The two standards that most interest us-the safety and feasibility
standards-also have their characteristic domains of application.
A. The "Safe" Level of Risk Imposition
The safe-level approach is taken in some aspects of clean air,
clean water, and pure food legislation, particularly regulation of toxic
62. My discussion here follows the presentation of these standards in the section on
cost-assessment in KEETON ET AL., 4th ed., supra note 56, at 1237-41 and the commentary
on that note by Lew Sargentich in KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY TORT
AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed.) 20-5 to 20-6 (1998) [hereinafter
TEACHER'S MANUAL].
63. See KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 62, at 20-6.
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substances that may endanger public health. The Food Quality Pro-
tection Act of 199664 is a case in point. The Act regulates the amount
of pesticide that may be present on foods, both fresh and processed.6 5
It requires that tolerances for pesticide be set at a level that is safe,
where "safe" means that "there is reasonable certainty that no harm
will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue,
including all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures."66
Regulators are instructed to set limits that provide an additional mar-
gin of safety in light of the special susceptibility of infants and chil-
dren to harm from toxic substances.67 Pesticide chemical residue on
food is therefore permissible only to the extent that it is reasonably
certain to harm no one-not even those unusually susceptible to
harm.
Clean air statutes also incorporate safety-based regulation.6' A
provision of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,69 for example,
focuses on cancer risks remaining after technology-based regulations
for hazardous pollutants have been in effect for six years.70 If a nu-
merically defined level of cancer risk has not been achieved by that
point, the EPA is directed to issue additional regulations that will
"provide an ample margin of safety to protect public health. ' 71 The
regulatory aim behind these provisions is to "reduce lifetime excess
cancer risks to the individual most exposed to emissions . . . to less
than one in one million."72 Some residual risk thus survives safe-level
regulation. Requiring that "lifetime excess cancer risks to the individ-
ual most exposed to emissions" be reduced "to less than one in one
million" expresses a judgment of significance. A lifetime risk of can-
cer (from a regulated emission) that crosses the "one in a million"
threshold crosses from the domain of insignificant risk into the do-
main of significant risk.
The emphasis on those most exposed to risk or those most sus-
ceptible to it-those most disadvantaged by the risks being regu-
64. Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136, and in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2000)).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (2) (A) (ii).
66. Id.
67. § 346a(b) (2) (C) (ii) (II).
68. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 258 (1976) (stating that the Clean Air
Act's three-year deadline purposely "leaves no room for claims of technological or eco-
nomic infeasibility").
69. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671
(2000)).





lated-is a recurring theme in safety-based regulation. Clean water
regulation supplies a closely related example: the court in Hercules,
Inc. v. EPAv" insisted on especially stringent precaution against grave
harm, even though the chance of that harm materializing could not
be estimated. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, T7 the court held, authorized health-based regulation of toxic
effluents without consideration of "feasibility, achievability, practica-
bility, economic impact, or cost," and addressed standards for deter-
mining permissible discharge levels for such toxins.7' EPA discharge
standards, the court ruled, must provide an "ample margin of safety"
and "protect against incompletely understood dangers to public
health and the environment, in addition to well-known risks.1 " 7 6 The
importance of safeguarding health trumps the goods with which it
competes, and the well-being of those most imperiled comes to the
fore. This is only natural: those most imperiled bear the greatest
burden.
B. Feasible Risk Reduction
The feasibility approach also governs aspects of clean air and
water regulation. The Clean Air Act, as amended in 1990, for exam-
ple, provides that regulatory standards for hazardous air pollutants
"shall require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions" that
the EPA, "taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emis-
sion reduction," determines to be "achievable. '77 Feasibility is also the
touchstone of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970,78 and
it is in this context that it has received its most extensive application
and judicial interpretation.
Feasibility-based regulation has a more complex structure than
safety-based regulation. Feasibility analysis requires, first, the identifi-
cation of "a significant [workplace] health risk"79 and, second, an
73. 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
74. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(2000)).
75. Hercues, 598 F.2d at 111.
76. Id. at 104.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2).
78. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(2000)).
79. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 615 (1980) [hereinafter
The Benzene Case]. The Court noted the importance of this threshold inquiry:
We agree with the Fifth Circuit's holding that § 3(8) requires the Secretary to
find, as a threshold matter, that the toxic substance in question poses a significant
health risk in the workplace and that a new, lower standard is therefore "reasona-
bly necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places
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analysis of the feasibility of reducing that risk without crippling the
activity that imposes the risk."° Feasibility, in turn, has two aspects-a
"technological" one and an "economic" one. Technological feasibility
analysis asks: What is the lowest level of risk technically attainable?
How much could we reduce this risk if we single-mindedly set out to
reduce it as much as possible?8 ' Economic feasibility analysis asks:
What is the lowest level of risk whose costs can be borne by the activity
that imposes the risk at issue?8 2 The aim of feasibility analysis is to
protect "worker health and safety within the limits of economic possi-
bility." 3 "Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs
and benefits [when it enacted the Occupational Health and Safety Act
of 1970 with its feasibility standard], by placing the 'benefit' of worker
health above all other considerations save those making attainment of
this 'benefit' unachievable."84 Feasibility analysis looks to achieve the
lowest level of risk practically attainable.
Feasibility analysis shares with safety analysis the idea that a risk
must be significant before it is subject to regulation. Feasibility is,
however, a new idea. Let us, then, postpone detailed exploration of
significance until we have fleshed out the two dimensions of feasibil-
ity-the technological and the economic.
1. Technological Feasibility.-The technological side of feasibility
analysis asks, as a matter of engineering technique, what is the lowest
level of risk achievable by an ongoing activity. Any limit set on risk-a
"permissible exposure level" (PEL)85 for a toxic substance, for exam-
ple-must be technologically attainable. Technological achievability,
however, is not fixed by the outer limit of technological possibility at a
given moment in time, because the most advanced techniques of risk
control in place at a given moment in time may fall well short of the
of employment." Unless and until such a finding is made, it is not necessary to
address the further question whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that
there must be a reasonable correlation between costs and benefits, or whether, as
the federal parties argue, the Secretary is then required by § 6(b) (5) to promul-




81. See KEETON ET AL., 4th ed., supra note 56, at 1238-39, 1252-53 (discussing the tech-
nological feasibility prong of feasibility analysis).
82. See id. at 1253-55 (discussing the economic feasibility prong of feasibility analysis).
83. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1263 n.102 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
84. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981). Following Lewis
Sargentich's usage, I shall refer to this case as The Cotton Dust Case. See KEETON ET AL., 4th
ed., supra note 56, at 1242.
85. The Cotton Dust Case, 452 U.S. at 500.
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frontier of technological feasibility. The frontier of technological fea-
sibility is fixed by the engineering practice that might be achieved
through a dogged commitment to feasible risk reduction. A regula-
tory agency promulgating a feasibility-based risk regulation may there-
fore specify an acceptable level of risk lower than that attainable
through the application of existing techniques, if the agency can rea-
sonably predict that technical capability will advance sufficiently to
make a lower level of risk imposition attainable within the time frame
of the regulation.
In American Iron & Steel Institute v. OSHA, 6 for example, OSHA's
standard for coke oven emissions was upheld as technologically feasi-
ble even though "the most modern and clean coke oven battery oper-
ating" met the standard only one-third of the time."7 Evidence of one-
third compliance using less than all suitable technology-plus dra-
matic progress toward compliance at another plant after new engi-
neering controls were implemented-showed sufficiently that the
standard was not "impossible of attainment.""8 The question was not
what could be done at the moment, but "what the industry could
achieve in an effort to best protect its... employees," given a determi-
nation to exploit "technological potentialities." 9 The court therefore
approved OSHA's reliance on "innovative technology currently in the
experimental stage,"9 ° and its faith in new techniques "looming over
the horizon."91
In United Steelworkers v. Marshall, Judge J. Skelly Wright gave the
following summary of the concept of "technological feasibility":
The oft-stated view of technological feasibility under the
OSH Act is that Congress meant the statute to be "technol-
ogy-forcing." This view means, at the very least, that OSHA
can impose a standard which only the most technologically
advanced plants in an industry have been able to achieve-
even if only in some of their operations some of the time.
But under this view OSHA can also force industry to develop
and diffuse new technology. At least where the agency gives
industry a reasonable time to develop new technology,
OSHA is not bound to the technological status quo. So long
as it presents substantial evidence that companies acting vig-
86. 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978).
87. Id. at 832.
88. Id. at 834.
89. Id. at 833, 834.
90. Id. at 835.
91. Id. at 833 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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orously and in good faith can develop the technology, OSHA
can require industry to meet PEL's never attained anywhere.
As for [proof of] technological feasibility, we know that
we cannot require of OSHA anything like certainty. Since
"technology-forcing" assumes the agency will make highly
speculative projections about future technology, a standard
is obviously not infeasible solely because OSHA has no hard
evidence to show that the standard has been met. More to
the point here, we cannot require OSHA to prove with any
certainty that industry will be able to develop the necessary
technology, or even to identify the single technological
means by which it expects industry to meet the PEL. OSHA
can force employers to invest all reasonable faith in their
own capacity for technological innovation, and can thereby
shift to industry some of the burden of choosing the best
strategy for compliance. OSHA's duty is to show that mod-
ern technology has at least conceived some industrial strate-
gies or devices which are likely to be capable of meeting the
PEL and which the industries are generally capable of
adopting.
Our view finds support in the statutory requirement that
OSHA act according to the "best available evidence." OSHA
cannot let workers suffer while it awaits the Godot of scien-
tific certainty.92
The requirement of technological feasibility thus imposes strin-
gent risk-reducing demands. It fixes the presumptively appropriate
level of precaution not by reference to what is customarily done, nor
even by reference to the best that is now done, but by reference to the
best that might be done, given an unstinting commitment to the goal of
feasible risk reduction.
2. Economic Feasibility.-In Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,93
the court provided an explanation of the economic side of feasibility
analysis. The court interpreted language in the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970 requiring "a standard for emissions of air pollutants
which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable ... taking
into account the cost of achieving such reduction. '9 4 It held that this
language did not direct EPA to undertake "a quantified cost-benefit
analysis" in order to justify its air pollution standard for new or modi-
92. 647 F.2d 1189, 1264-66 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
93. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
94. Id. at 378 (citation omitted).
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fled cement plants.95 EPA's conclusion that the cement industry
could absorb the cost of control devices without detriment to competi-
tion between cement and substitute products, even though some
plants might have to close, sufficed to answer the "essential question"
under the Act: "whether the mandated standards can be met by a par-
ticular industry for which they are set."9 6 Judgments of economic fea-
sibility require "cost-assessment," but they do not require "cost-benefit
analysis."9 Indeed, insofar as the criterion of cost-justified precaution
requires less precaution than the criterion of economic feasibility
does, the criterion of economic feasibility rejects the criterion of cost-
justification outright.
Provisions of the Clean Water Act that mandate pollution control
to the extent "technologically and economically achievable"98 also il-
lustrate the economic side of feasibility-based regulation. The Clean
Water Act subjects water pollution sources to two different sorts of
effluent limitations: those based on "the best practicable control tech-
nology currently available" (BPT)," and those based on "the best
available technology economically achievable" (BAT)."' The BPT
standard generalizes "the best existing performance" in an industry-
"control practices in exemplary plants"-despite an expectation of
"economic hardship, including the closing of some plants." 1 ' The
BAT standards are more stringent. They require "a commitment of
the maximum resources economically possible to the ultimate goal of
eliminating all polluting discharges."'0 2 The setting of BPT standards
involves "cost-benefit analysis," but cost-benefit analysis is not part of
BAT determinations.' In determining the economic achievability of
a technology, "the EPA must consider the 'cost' of meeting BAT limi-
tations, but need not compare such cost with the benefits of effluent
reduction."104
For "economic feasibility" analyses, then, the ultimate question is
not whether costs are outweighed by benefits, but whether the indus-
try is able to bear the cost. Economic feasibility regulation by OSHA
95. Id. at 387.
96. Id. at 389.
97. Id. at 387.
98. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(2)(B), 1317(a)(2).
99. § 1311(b)(1)(A).
100. § 1311(b) (2) (A).
101. EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 76 & n.15, 79 (1980).
102. Id. at 74.
103. Id. at 71 n.10 (citation omitted).
104. Rybacheck v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1990).
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means "protecting worker health and safety within the limits of eco-
nomic possibility."1 °5 Judge Skelly Wright again explains:
The most useful general judicial criteria for economic
feasibility comes from Judge McGowan's opinion in Indus-
trial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson. A standard is not infea-
sible simply because it is financially burdensome, or even
because it threatens the survival of some companies within
an industry:
Nor does the concept of economic feasibility necessarily
guarantee the continued existence of individual employ-
ers. It would appear to be consistent with the purposes
of the Act to envisage the economic demise of an em-
ployer who has lagged behind the rest of the industry in
protecting the health and safety of employees and is
consequently financially unable to comply with new
standards as quickly as other employers.
A standard is feasible if it does not threaten "massive dis-
location" to, or imperil the existence of, the industry. No
matter how initially frightening the projected total or annual
costs of compliance appear, a court must examine those
costs in relation to the financial health and profitability of
the industry and the likely effect of such costs on unit con-
sumer prices. . . . [T]he practical question is whether the
standard threatens the competitive stability of an industry, or
whether any intra-industry or inter-industry discrimination in
the standard might wreck such stability or lead to undue
concentration.
... [A]s for [proof of] economic feasibility, OSHA must
construct a reasonable estimate of compliance costs and
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that these costs will not
threaten the existence or competitive structure of an indus-
try, even if it does portend disaster for some marginal
firms. 
10 6
In The Cotton Dust Case, both the court of appeals and the Su-
preme Court upheld OSHA's assessment of economic feasibility.'0 7
OSHA had concluded that "compliance with the standard [was] well
within the financial capability" of the cotton industry.' The agency
noted that "although some marginal employers may shut down rather
105. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1263 n.102 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
106. Id. at 1265, 1272 (citations omitted).
107. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1979), affd in part & vacated in
part by Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 536 (1981).
108. The Cotton Dust Case, 452 U.S. at 531 (citation omitted).
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than comply, the industry as a whole will not be threatened."
' Both
courts agreed that OSH1A had shown that the industry would be able
to absorb the projected costs.'" 0 Regulatory requirements remain eco-
nomically feasible, the court of appeals wrote, even though they "im-
pose substantial costs on an industry... or ... force some employers
out of business," as long as they are not "prohibitively expensive" and
do not make "financial viability generally impossible." '' The cotton
dust controls fit "the plain meaning of the word 'feasible,"' the Su-
preme Court wrote, given OSHA's conclusion "that the industry will
maintain long-term profitability and competitiveness." ' 2
3. Significance.-Feasibility analysis, like safety analysis, requires
the identification of "significant risks" of "health injury."' 13 What
makes a risk "significant" and why should significant risks be singled
out for special treatment? The significance requirement receives its
canonical exposition in The Benzene Case.'14 Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Stevens agreed with the Fifth Circuit's holding that
§ 3(8) [of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970]
requires the Secretary to find, as a threshold matter, that the
toxic substance in question poses a significant health risk in
the workplace and that a new, lower standard is therefore
"reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment."
' 1 5
"Unless and until such a finding is made," the requirement that
the risk be reduced as far as technologically and economically feasible
is not triggered.1" 6 Justice Stevens rejected OSHA's contention that
no significance requirement was necessary:
If the purpose of the statute were to eliminate com-
pletely and with absolute certainty any risk of serious harm,
we would agree that [OSHA's approach] would be proper
109. Id. (citation omitted).
110. Id at 530-36.
111. Marshall, 617 F.2d at 655, 661 (citations omitted).
112. The Cotton Dust Case, 452 U.S. at 530 n.55 (citations omitted).
113. Safety-based risk regulation requires the elimination of significant risks, whereas
feasibility-based regulation only requires the elimination of such risks if feasible.
114. 448 U.S. 607, 639-59 (1980).
115. Id. at 614-15. Section 3(8) of the Act provides:
The term "occupational safety and health standard" means a standard which re-
quires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, meth-
ods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe
or healthful employment and places of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 652(8).
116. The Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 615.
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.... But we think it is clear that the statute was not designed
to require employers to provide absolutely risk-free work-
places whenever it is technologically feasible to do so, so long
as the cost is not great enough to destroy an entire industry.
Rather, both the language and structure of the Act, as well as
its legislative history, indicate that it was intended to require
the elimination, as far as feasible, of significant risks of harm.
By empowering the Secretary to promulgate standards
that are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe
or healthful employment and places of employment," the
Act implies that, before promulgating any standard, the Sec-
retary must make a finding that the workplaces in question
are not safe. But "safe" is not the equivalent of "risk-free."
There are many activities that we engage in every day-such
as driving a car or even breathing city air-that entail some
risk of accident or material health impairment; nevertheless,
few people would consider these activities "unsafe." Simi-
larly, a workplace can hardly be considered "unsafe" unless it
threatens the workers with a significant risk of harm.
Therefore, before he can promulgate any permanent
health or safety standard, the Secretary is required to make a
threshold finding that a place of employment is unsafe-in
the sense that significant risks are present and can be elimi-
nated or lessened by a change in practices.' 17
"Significance" appears to have two principal aspects.' 18 First, the
risk must be salient-it must be distinguishable from other risks asso-
ciated either with the activity in question or with social life in gen-
eral. 119 It must stand out among its fellow risks. Second, to be
significant, when a risk ripens into harm it must inflict a severe injury,
a devastating injury, the kind of injury that seriously impairs ordinary
life.12 ° It seems natural to suppose that the same basic ideas underlie
the concept of significance as it is used in safety-based risk regulation.
Beyond these two points, however, just how to interpret significance is
a difficult question. Is significance a purely quantitative notion?
Some numerical threshold combining magnitude and probability? Or
is it a more qualitative and contextual judgment, one which depends
on the distinctive features of the context in which it arises? May the
numerically same risk of death be significant in the workplace, but
117. Id. at 641-42.
118. See KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 62, at 20-7.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 20-8.
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trivial in an extreme sport? May risks of equivalent probability and
magnitude in one sense-equal risks of death, for example-vary in
significance if one way of dying is more widely feared than another?
Significance is measured by a purely quantitative criterion at least
some of the time. The amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1990, for
example, aim "to reduce lifetime excess cancer risks to the individual
most exposed to emissions.., to less than one in one million."1 2 ' But
the concept of significance cannot be exhausted by any purely quanti-
tative criterion. For one thing, significant risks are salient ones, and
salience is a matter of standing out. Salient phenomena stand out in a
context-against a background.122 Salient risks are prominent risks,
risks which jut out in the context of the activity subject to regulatory
scrutiny. Probability of harm can be expressed by a purely quantitative
measure-by a number-but the significance of a particular
probability of harm depends in part on the background against which
that probability is framed. That background or context can be gen-
eral or particular, or general in some ways and particular in others.
Particular risks of cancer, for example, can involve the general risk of
contracting the disease, the general risk of contracting a particular
cancer, the risks inherent in a particular occupation, and so on.
Significance eludes purely quantitative measure for another rea-
son as well: The relation of significance to serious injury-to devastat-
ing injury-builds qualitative evaluation into the concept of
significance. Devastating injuries are ones that impair normal func-
tioning-normal life-in ways that cannot be repaired, and "normal
life" is an evaluative idea. Even the purely quantitative criterion of
significance employed by the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act
operates against a background in which the gravity of the harm being
considered has already been fixed qualitatively in this way. Cancer is
generally a serious disease-a disease quite capable of inflicting death
and devastating injury-and that is enough to establish that we have
especially urgent reason to reduce the incidence of such harm.
Consider the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The signifi-
cance of the risk of cancer addressed by those amendments depends
in this way on the background risk of cancer. Discussion of "excess
cancer risks" presumes a preexisting risk of cancer-a risk indepen-
dent of exposure to the particular emission being appraised. The
121. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2) (A); see supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (describing
the regulatory aims of the Clean Air Act).
122. As Lewis Sargentich puts it: "The risk to be averted must be ... noteworthy in
comparison with other risks of the same activity that might also be reduced further by
costly measures." KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 62, at 20-7.
20051
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Clean Air Act's one-in-a-million threshold for "excess risk" thus de-
fines an acceptable level of increased risk for a harm whose gravity we
have already largely agreed upon, and of which there is a preexisting
incidence.
Why fix "one in a million" as the threshold separating acceptable
increases in excess risk from unacceptable ones? Four reasons come
readily to mind. First, that threshold defines a negligible level of risk,
a level of risk that we might reasonably disregard entirely. Reducing a
risk to the point where it might reasonably be disregarded entirely is,
presumably, reducing it to the point where it is no longer significant.
Second, we already face greater threats in our daily lives-the annual
risk of death by automobile accident, for example is 1 in 6,500,123 and
the annual risk of death from cancer is less than 1 in 500.124 Given
these other threats, we feel justifiably comfortable entirely disregard-
ing excess risks of cancer less than one in a million-in treating them
as functionally equivalent to no risk at all. 125 Third, we might choose
to tolerate excess risks of cancer less than one in a million-but not
risks greater than that-because the background risk of cancer is
alarming, and we are eager not to see it increase. Fourth, "one in a
million" has a natural prominence-a salience-as a measure of sig-
nificance arbitrary in its exactitude but reasonable in its general order
of magnitude. Who would fix on 1 in 997,832?126
But the idea of significance is not purely quantitative. To see
more clearly just how and why the concept of significance cannot be
exhausted by purely quantitative criteria, consider the risk of gas tank
explosions in automobile accidents-the subject of the famous Ford
123. In 2000, there were 15.23 automobile accident fatalities for every 100,000 people.
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2000: A COMPILATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE
CRASH DATA FROM THE FATALITY ANALYSIS REPORTING SYSTEM AND THE GENERAL ESTIMATES
SYSTEM 15 (2001) [hereinafter TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2000], available at http://www-nrd.
nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSFAnn/TSF2000.pdf.
124. In 1998, the death rate for all cancers was 202.6 per 100,000. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., 2001 CANCER PROGRESS REPORT 63 (2001), available at
http://progressreport.cancer.gov/2001/additinalMaterials/sectinPDFs/NCICPR2001.
PDF.
125. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-349, at 76 (1994) ("[T]he term 'reasonable certainty of no
harm' means an increased risk of cancer to an individual exposed over a lifetime of no
more than one in one million.").
126. Kathryn A. Kelly and Nanette C. Cardon's critical account of the origins of the one-
in-a-million standard lends some support to this hypothesis. Two scientists randomly chose
a safety standard of one in one hundred million in a 1961 article attempting to define
when exposure to a substance could be considered "safe." The FDA adopted that number
in a 1973 notice in the Federal Register, and changed it to one in one million by the time
that final rule was issued in 1977. Kathryn A. Kelly & Nanette C. Cardon, The Myth of 10 -6
as a Definition of Acceptable Risk, EPA WATCH, Sept. 15, 1994, at 5.
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Pinto case.' 27 Risks of gas tank explosions strike us, intuitively, as
prominent risks of driving. Among the myriad risks of automobile
accidents, the dangers of fire and explosion stand out. The explosive
properties of gasoline make it especially dangerous. Most of us imag-
ine that it is particularly horrible to be burned to death, and many of
us may think it worse still to survive a terrible fire horribly disfigured.
These judgments involve assessments of magnitude that might be ex-
pressed quantitatively: People might be able to rank injury by gasoline
explosion on a scale with other possible injuries from automobile acci-
dents, and we might be able to assign a number to the relative dis-
value that they place on such injuries. But ajudgment that the risks of
gasoline tank failure are a significant risk of driving is both evaluative
to its core and inherently comparative. And comparison cannot be
made without attending to context, a point illustrated by the differ-
ence in significance of risks of gas tank explosions in motorcycles and
cars, respectively.
The numerical risk of gasoline tank explosions is equal in
motorcycles and in passenger cars,128 and the risks of gas tank explo-
sions may well be more dangerous in motorcycles, since riders are
both closer to and less protected from their gas tanks. Does it follow
that the risk of gas tank explosions is as significant for motorcycles as
it is for passenger cars? It seems unlikely to me that it does. Even if
gas tank explosions are equally frequent and more dangerous in
motorcycles than in passenger cars, the risk of gas tank explosion is
qualitatively more significant in passenger cars. The risks associated
with motorcycle gas tanks are framed by the heightened risks charac-
teristic of motorcycles. The exposed character of motorcycle riding
and the relatively small size of motorcycles in comparison with cars
and trucks expose motorcyclists to a host of other substantial risks-to
greater-than-normal risks of being crushed in collisions with other ve-
hicles, to greater-than-normal risks of being thrown from their cycles,
and to greater-than-normal risks of severe head trauma, to name just
three. Risks of gasoline tank explosion do not stand out as compara-
bly salient-comparably significant-in such company.
The heightened risks of gas tank explosion in passenger cars-
Ford Pintos, for example-are, by contrast, salient, gratuitous, and
unexpected in just the way that the risks of gas tank explosion in
motorcycles are not. Ford Pintos were family cars: children rode in
their back seats. Pinto purchasers sought a higher level of safety than
127. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
128. In both passenger cars and motorcycles there is a 0.1% chance of a fire occurring.
TR.Amrc SAFETY FACTS 2000, supra note 123, at 66.
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motorcyclists. They did not choose to forego the protections of a pas-
senger compartment for themselves and their offspring in exchange
for the thrills of immediate exposure to both road and machine. Im-
plicit in the purchase of a subcompact family sedan is a desire to re-
duce the risks of private automotive transportation, consistent with
the constraints imposed by the fact that the car being purchased is a
comparatively inexpensive subcompact. In this context, the risks of
gas tank fires stand out, quite independent of any hidden flaw in the
car. For people who are trying to keep their children safe, the risks of
an automobile's gas tank are especially salient. Gasoline explosions
threaten horrible deaths, horrible disfigurements, and terrible psy-
chological trauma.129 These characteristics make the risks of gas tank
explosion in subcompact cars qualitatively significant in a way that
risks from motorcycle gas tanks are not, even if those risks are quan-
titatively much greater.
The significance of a risk, then, is not fundamentally a quantita-
tive matter, a matter of statistical probability and magnitude measured
numerically. Significance depends on both gravity and salience. De-
termining the gravity of a risk requires evaluative and qualitative judg-
ments-judgments about how much we should fear a particular kind
of harm or harms, how much a particular harm impairs the pursuit of
a normal life, how bad it would be to live with that harm, and so on.
Determining the salience of a risk requires notjust an appraisal of the
risk's numerical probability, but also an evaluation of how prominent
the risk is in comparison to the other risks of an activity.
III. SAFETY, FEASIBIHTY, AND FAIRNESS
Safety- and feasibility-based risk regulation raise three basic ques-
tions. First, when we push beyond the cost-justified level of safety, why
should we eliminate only significant risks of physical injury? Why not
eliminate all risks of physical injury? Second, why should we some-
times require the elimination of all significant risks of injury and
other times require only the elimination of those significant risks
whose elimination is feasible? Why are we prepared to shut down
some activities that cannot be made safe, but not others? Third, how
do the answers to these questions and the standards that they support
relate to the reasons of fairness we have for pressing precaution be-
yond the point of cost-justification?
129. Aspects of the Pinto's design made the failure of its gas tank even more salient. In
comparison with other subcompact cars, the design of the Pinto was the first to be stripped
of common safety features in conjunction with inadequate placement of the gas tank.
Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1027-28.
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A. Justifying the "Significance" Requirement
Considerations of fairness and comparable value justify moving
beyond the cost-justified level of precaution when risks of devastating
injury are at issue and show both safety- and feasibility-based regula-
tion to be reasonable in broad outline. By themselves, however, con-
siderations of fairness and comparable value do not justify the two
central and striking characteristics of safety-based regulation. First,
that standard requires safety but not absolute safety. Both the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act and the Supreme Court's opinion
in The Benzene Case make clear that the elimination of significant risk is
not the same as the elimination of all risk.13° So the safe level of risk is
not the same as "no risk." Second, safety-based regulation is all risk
evaluation and no cost assessment. Significant risks must be reduced
until they are insignificant-without regard to cost-but insignificant
risks are tolerated, also without inquiring into the cost of eliminating
them. These features of the statutory standard raise a number of
questions: Why draw the line at significance? Why not eliminate all
risks of devastating injury? Why ignore all of the costs of eliminating
significant risks? If we are prepared to eliminate significant risks with-
out regard to cost, why should we refrain from eliminating insignifi-
cant risks without so much as inquiring into the costs of doing so?
1. Why Does Safety-Based Risk Regulation Leave "Insignificant" Risks
of Devastating Injury Untouched?-Safety-based risk regulation is partic-
ularly stringent. As familiar as we are with cost-benefit analysis and its
insistence on balancing costs and benefits so as to extract the greatest
possible benefit from risky but valuable activities, we can hardly help
but be struck by the fact that categorical judgments of significance
push risk-reduction beyond the point of maximal benefit, economi-
cally conceived. But the doctrine has a lax side as well-it leaves insig-
nificant risks entirely untouched-and this lenient side is equally
noteworthy. Why should a standard that forbids trading safety against
costs above some threshold level of risk have a threshold to begin
with? Even insignificant risks of devastating injury are risks of devas-
tating harm. A lifetime excess cancer risk of less than one in a million
is still a risk of a devastating disease, and devastating disease, when it
materializes, wreaks havoc in our lives. At worst, it ends life prema-
turely and traumatically. At best, it impairs life severely, foreclosing
the pursuit of certain activities and ways of life, seriously hampering
the pursuit of others, and often leaving us with enduring, agonizing
130. Supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
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pain and suffering. The fact that it impairs our lives so seriously is,
after all, what makes devastating harm devastating. Why then should
we tolerate any risk of such harm?
An answer to that question lies in the fundamentals of the predic-
ament with which the law of accidents must grapple. We each have
various aims, ends, and aspirations to pursue over the course of our
lives. We may each expect, with decent luck, to pursue our aims and
aspirations over the course of normal life spans. To pursue our aims
and aspirations effectively over the course of complete lives, however,
we need both freedom to act (liberty) and freedom from physical
harm (security). Liberty and security are preconditions of rational
agency. Like Rawls's "primary goods,"'' liberty and security are
things that we each need if we are to realize any aims or aspirations.
Liberty is essential because we can neither survive nor realize much of
anything of value unless we are free to engage in a wide range of activ-
ities. But security is equally essential. Physical injury can end our lives
prematurely or leave us permanently impaired in ways that prevent us
from pursuing many valuable ends and aspirations. Indeed, even inju-
ries that do not kill or permanently harm us may disrupt our lives in
ways that utterly upend our life plans.
Our predicament is that liberty and security conflict. Risk of
physical harm-diminished security-is the byproduct of action. Di-
minished liberty is the price of increased security. We cannot farm or
build or drive or fly-or mill cotton and refine benzene-without tak-
ing and imposing risks of devastating injury. Some risk of accidental
injury is the price of activity. 13 2 We cannot help but eat and drink, yet
eating and drinking exposes us to risks of death and disease. We can-
not help but travel about, but traveling about by whatever means we
can devise-foot, car, horse, or rickshaw-puts both us and others in
physical peril. Foregoing all activity would itself be a short path to
death, and even if death could somehow be avoided, forgoing all activ-
131. See, e.g., RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 27, at 181 (preliminarily listing
five primary goods: basic rights, freedom of opportunity, participation in political and eco-
nomic institutions, income and wealth, and self-respect).
132. The impossibility of preventing all accidental injury is a fundamental fact that any
approach to accident law must acknowledge. James M. Buchanan, for example, begins his
defense of caveat emptor in products liability law with the following comment:
It is useful to note at the outset that accidents cannot be prevented, in the sense
that the probability of occurrence cannot be reduced to zero. We live in an un-
certain world, whether we like it or not, and the working properties of either
human or material agents cannot be completely specified. Any discussion of
products liability, therefore, involves only the possible modification in the
probability distribution of accidents.
James M. Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 64, 64 (1970).
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ity would cripple the pursuit of our aims and aspirations as surely and
severely as devastating physical injury does. A world in which no one
moves is a world in which few, if any, aims, ends, and aspirations can
be realized, and few, if any, lives can be led.
Risks that cannot be eliminated without ceasing the activity that
engenders them are the background risks of social life. The only way
to eliminate them is by bringing activity to a halt.
133 Some "back-
ground" risks are typical of social life in general; they are not the price
of any particular activity but of activity in general. Other background
risks are typical of particular activities; they are the price of engaging
in those activities. Background risks are acceptable-worth bearing-
because eliminating them works even more harm to our ability to lead
the lives we wish to lead than bearing them does, even though these
risks are sure to result in some devastating injuries.
The fact that a low level of risk of devastating injury-the back-
ground level of risk-is an inescapable price of activity explains why a
significance requirement must be introduced, implicitly or explicitly,
into even the most stringent standards of risk regulation. The back-
ground level of risk must be accepted even though that level results in
some devastating injuries, because some risk of devastating injury is
the price of activity and activity is worth having. Before we attempt to
reduce a risk we must, then, first conclude that it crosses the threshold
that separates eliminable risks from uneliminable ones. We must de-
cide if the risk in question crosses a threshold of significance. With-
out a significance requirement, safety-based risk regulation would be
self-defeating. One essential condition for leading a worthwhile life-
liberty-would be destroyed in the name of securing another essential
condition-security.
a. Lives for Convenience?-This answer, however, appears to
undermine our critique of cost-benefit analysis, and to vindicate Cala-
bresi's claim that we are quite prepared to sacrifice lives for conve-
nience.' I have faulted unrestricted cost-benefit analysis because it
133. See KEETON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 62, at 20-8 ("Safety means that no
significant risk remains. But safety is not attainable, by assumption, unless valuable activity
ceases."); Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality, supra note 10, at 351 (discussing a "mutu-
ally imposed and mutually beneficial level of background risk" consisting of "very, very low
probability risks" that are "simply the price of freedom to act").
134. See THE CosTs OF AccIDENTS, supra note 3, at 17. The proposition that we do and
should trade lives for convenience has also been defended very forcefully by Alastair Nor-
cross. See Alastair Norcross, Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives, 26 PHIL. & PUB.
Aen. 135 (1997); Alastair Norcross, Speed Limits, Human Lives and Convenience: A Reply to




licenses the infliction of devastating injury on a few for the sake of
trivial gains to many.1 35 When trivial gains to a large number of per-
sons stand on the credit side of the balance sheet and devastating
harms to a few stand on the debit side, the imposition of the risks in
question should be forbidden. No number of trivial gains to some can
ever compare to a single devastating injury to another. The gains and
the losses are simply not comparable, morally speaking. Or so I have
argued.
Our willingness to tolerate background risks of devastating injury,however, suggests that we sometimes do inflict devastation on a fewfor the sake of trivial gains by many. When we count certain risks offire among the background risks of life, we countenance some inci-
dence of death and disfigurement, and some of that death and disfig-
urement will be occasioned by trivial gains to others. When we count
a risk that inflicts devastation on a very few a background risk of life,
are we not countenancing the infliction of devastating injury for the
sake of trivial gain-for the sake of convenience? If so, must not ei-
ther our critique of cost-benefit analysis or our toleration of back-
ground risk be mistaken?
The argument that we take lives for the sake of convenience
seems even stronger if we turn our attention to the activity of driving.
Driving is the riskiest of our ordinary activities. A normal American
driver exposes herself to an annual risk of death of approximately 1 in
6,500.136 This, surely, is a significant risk of devastating injury. Adriver subject to a 1 in 6,500 annual risk of death is subject, over the
course of a normal lifespan, to a lifetime risk of death by driving of
roughly 1 in 80. If a lifetime excess risk of cancer of one in one mil-lion is significant, a lifetime risk of death of I in 80 is much more than
significant. Yet, precisely because driving is so essential to normal
American life, we routinely take to the road in pursuit of trivial ends-
to get to work, to go to the market, to see a movie, to take our chil-dren to softball practices and soccer games, and so on. Yet each time
we drive, we impose a significant risk of devastating injury. How can
this be justifiable? How can such trivial ends justify the infliction of a
substantial amount of devastating injury? How can we exchange lives
for convenience?
To be sure, the risks of devastating injury imposed by the activity
of driving today may well be unacceptably high. In all likelihood, we
should be taking various steps to reduce these risks, even if those steps
135. Supra note 48 and accompanying text.
136. Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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come at some cost in convenience. But this answer merely sidesteps
the challenge. Even if we reduce the risks of driving, it seems unrea-
sonable to suppose that we will reduce them to the point where driv-
ing no longer kills and maims. Some trips to the movies will inevitably
end in devastating injury and death. Lives will thus be taken in ex-
change for trivial ends-sometimes for nothing more urgent than the
convenience of getting somewhere more quickly by hopping in the
car. Leaving even insignificant risks of devastating injury untouched
thus seems to guarantee that lives will be exchanged for mere conve-
nience. How can that be either acceptable, or consistent with our crit-
icisms of cost-benefit analysis?
The beginnings of an answer lie in a fundamental characteristic
of accidents, one remarked upon by Frank Michelman in the course
of distinguishing the "pollution problem" from the problem of acci-
dental injury:
It is of the essence of an "accident" that, while the fre-
quency of its occurrence in general form may perhaps be
statistically ascertained, its particular incidence is unpredict-
able. Moreover, as soon as an accident has occurred it is
over, and can no longer be prevented. There is, in short, an
important sense in which any accident can be called
unintentional.
13 7
The appearance of exchanging life for convenience arises when we
focus on an ordinary errand that ends in accidental death or devastat-
ing injury. In hindsight, we appear to have exchanged life for mere
convenience. But because particular accidents cannot be predicted
we are never in a position to choose between life and convenience in
the way that hindsight supposes us to have chosen. The unavoidable
randomness of particular accidents means that when we are choosing
to impose or to bear risks of death or devastation we can only
choose-can only evaluate-the merits of various classes of risks or
practices of risk imposition. We can, for example, evaluate the merits
of making a practice of running ordinary errands by private automo-
bile but we cannot rationally evaluate the merits of running one par-
ticular errand among ten thousand indistinguishable errands by
automobile. Evaluating any particular errand is fruitless.
It is therefore a mistake to believe that the risks of driving are
unacceptably high because each instance of driving imposes a risk of
137. Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's
Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 666 (1971) (book review). Michelman's principal point is that




devastating injury for the sake of trivial gain. What is at stake in evalu-
ating the reasonableness of the risks of driving is a general practice-
the loose practice of private automobile use as it now exists in this
country. Within the practice as we now conduct it, each of the innu-
merable risk impositions that put others at risk of devastating injury
for trivial gain are essentially indistinguishable from each other. No
trip to the grocery store, to the movies, or to the theater, is especially
urgent. (Contrast an ambulance taking a critically ill person to a hos-
pital.) So if we judge any one automobile errand unacceptable be-
cause it wrongly risks devastating injury for trivial gain, we shouldjudge all such errands unacceptable. When we shift our focus from
particular trip to general practice, however, we encounter a benefit
that is not trivial. Collectively, these mundane trips are an important
part of a normal life in our society. Doing without a private automo-
bile in contemporary Los Angeles, for instance, is a hardship-the
kind of hardship that makes the lives of the working poor in Los An-
geles so onerous.
b. Instances and Practices of Risk Imposition.-The importantlesson here is independent of the acceptability of the practice of pri-
vate automobile use as it now exists in our society. It is a lesson about
the inevitability and ineliminability of risk. Even an acceptable prac-
tice of transportation will impose some risk of devastating injury for
apparently trivial gain. By car, by train, by foot, or by bike, we will still
transport ourselves to work, to the market, and to the video store, and
in doing so we will still risk death and devastating injury. Some back-
ground risk of devastating injury is the price of any practice of trans-
portation. That risk can be avoided only by ceasing the practice of
transportation entirely-an unacceptably high cost. Some risks of
devastating injury are therefore justifiably imposed even though eachinstance of their imposition realizes only trivial benefit, because there
is no plausible way of distinguishing among the instances of risk impo-
sition that we are considering, and the burden of eliminating all in-
stances of such risk imposition is comparable to the significant risk of
devastating injury that the practice creates. The other side of this coin
is that we have reason to engage in particular instances of risk imposi-
tion falling within the practice at issue, even though those instances
risk devastating injury for trivial gain. If we have reason not to forgo
driving as an activity, then we have reason to take to the road for triv-
ial reasons, even though we impose significant risks of devastating in-jury when we do so. We cannot tell which trip to the grocery store or
to the movies will end in devastating injury. We therefore have no
[VOL. 64:159
PRICELESSNESS AND LiFE
good reason to forgo any particular trip, and good reason not to forgo
all of them.
Once we think of ourselves as adopting a principle to cover a class
of cases-once we train our gaze on a practice of risk imposition-the
dissimilarity between the activity of driving and the hypothetical in-
volving the endangered television technician becomes evident.
1 3 8
Life-threatening injuries to television technicians are not so common
that a practice of rescuing endangered technicians at the price of
shutting down television transmission for the duration of the rescue is
likely to jeopardize the very practice of transmitting television sig-
nals.1 39 The burden of rescue will not seriously disrupt a normal life,
even over the long run. Forbidding going to the grocery store, to the
movies, or to work, whenever doing so risks devastating injury would,
by contrast, profoundly disrupt our lives. It would forbid most of our
going out and about in the world and would preclude living a normal
life. 140
Significance thus distinguishes the realm of irreducible, or una-
voidable, risk from the realm of avoidable risk. Without the signifi-
cance requirement, safety-based regulation would require the
elimination of every discernible risk of devastating injury. But the
elimination of all discernible risk requires the elimination of all dis-
cernible activity. And the elimination of all discernible activity is a
cure worse than the disease it treats.
B. Why Exclude Costs Entirely?
These arguments justify and explain the threshold of signifi-
cance, but what of the second distinctive feature of safe-level analy-
sis-its disregard of the costs of reducing risks to the point of
insignificance? Consider, for example, the determination in the Food
Quality Protection Act of 1996 that tolerances for pesticide residue
must be set at a level that is safe, where "safe" means that "there is a
138. Supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
139. Note, too, that the television technician example involves rescue after the fact 
of
accident, not accidental injury itself. Change the hypothetical so that it involves a "pure
accident"-the killing of someone by the non-negligent collapse of a transmission 
tower
that buckled under the strain of broadcasting Baywatch-and it no longer involves trading
life for convenience. The question would then be what it would cost to prevent every 
such
transmission tower collapse from causing serious physical injury.
140. There is, to be sure, a paradox here: It strikes us that it is wrong to put our lives 
at
risk for the convenience of renting a video most quickly, but right to run a larger 
risk of
death to view a sufficient number of indistinguishable valuable videos quickly. A 
course of
action that appears irrational in each instance appears rational when considered as a 
class.
The phenomenon is, I believe, an instance of a "lottery paradox," and I discuss it in some
detail in Keating, Pressing Precaution, supra note 0, at 704-08.
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reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure
to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary ex-
posures and all other exposures for which there is reliable informa-
tion.""14 This determination expresses a legislative judgment that the
costs of reducing pesticide residues to safe levels not only may be disre-
garded entirely, but must be disregarded entirely. Structurally, then,
safety-based regulation is radically different from cost-benefit analysis.To determine an appropriate level of safety, cost-benefit analysis in-
sists on balancing all relevant considerations (as it conceives them) in
a comprehensive calculus. Safety-based regulation insists on excluding
an entire class of arguably relevant reasons-namely, costs-from the
exercise of fixing an acceptable level of risk. 1 42
Why-or in what contexts-should we disregard entirely the costs
of eliminating significant risks, pursuing risk reduction until we have
cut the risk to the point at which it is no longer significant? In answer-ing this question, it helps, I think, to realize that the safety norm de-
fines an attractive social world so far as risks of physical injury are
concerned. The risks that it tolerates are ones whose probability is solow that we may reasonably ignore them. A social world sufficiently
safe that each of us might reasonably expect to live a life of normallength-secure in the knowledge that we can reasonably expect that
our lives will not be cut short by death or devastating injury-is animmensely attractive social world. The basic premise of the safety
norm is that we should not sacrifice such a world unless we stand to
gain something of comparable value. We should, therefore, eliminate
significant risks of injury when the costs of doing so are not compara-
ble to the devastation that significant risks are sure to wreak. This
deceptively simple answer suggests a division of labor between safety-
and feasibility-based risk regulation. Safety-based risk regulation is ap-propriate when the costs of reducing risks of devastating injury to the
point at which they are no longer significant are not comparable to
the costs of bearing those risks of devastating injury. Feasibility-based
risk reduction is appropriate where the costs of reducing risks of dev-
astating injury to the point at which they are no longer significant are
comparable to the cost of bearing those risks of devastating injury.
141. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (2) (A) (ii).
142. The "exclusionary" character of safety-based risk regulation should not be consid-




IV. COMPARABLE VALUE IN SAFETY AND FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS
A. Comparable Value and Safety-Based Risk Regulation
The harms threatened by the risks that are subject to safety-based
regulation are a particular sort of irreparable injury. The costs of un-
safe food, air, and water are borne in irreparable injury to health, and
health is an essential condition of effective human agency-a kind of
primary good. What about the benefits of bearing risks to health, or
the flip side of the coin, the costs of reducing such risks? How should
we characterize them? Pesticide residue on our crops is the byproduct
of the pursuit of greater agricultural productivity. Toxins in our air
and water are byproducts of ordinary, economically productive activi-
ties (ubiquitous byproducts, perhaps). The enactment of safety-based
regulatory statutes expresses a categorical judgment that the costs
these productive activities must bear in order to eliminate significant
risks of devastating harm are acceptable. We need not inquire into
the costs of eliminating significant risk on a case-by-case basis, and we
need not attend to the marginal balance of cost and benefit in any
particular case, because the benefits of significant risk are simply not
comparable to the incidence of harm to human health that is their
price. The safety-based regime in place for the regulation of the risks
of pesticide residues on agricultural products, for example, expresses
the conclusion that no amount of increased agricultural productivity
can justify imposing a significant risk of devastating disease. The ben-
efits of more risk-the increased yield in crops harvested per acre
planted and the like-are not the kind of benefits that can justify the
increased incidence of devastating injury that is their price.
Why might a reasonable legislature come to the conclusion that
the benefits of increased agricultural productivity cannot justify im-
posing a significant risk of devastating injury? In part, because a rea-
sonable legislature should reject the central idea of unrestricted cost-
benefit analysis-that all goods are commensurable, fungible at some
ratio of exchange. Laws like the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996
reject this idea of universal commensurability. They implicitly single
out health for special protection. Safety-based statutes assume that
health-like the physical integrity of the person-is a kind of primary
good, something that each person needs in order to realize her aims
and aspirations over the course of a normal life span, whatever those
aims and aspirations may be. 4 ' Health has a special urgency. It is
143. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 27, at 187-90 (describing primary
goods as "citizens' needs"). See generally id. at 173-211. The contrast between needs and
preferences (or wants) is fundamental to the contrast between safety-based regulation and
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part of a package of goods that are essential conditions of rational
agency, and it takes priority over lesser, inessential goods. Health
should only be sacrificed when we stand to gain more of something
comparable.
But a hierarchical view of human interests is only one part of thejustification for safety-based risk regulation. Safety-based risk regula-
tion also rests on particular, historically and socially contingent claims
of value. The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, for example, im-
plicitly rests on the particular, historically contingent claim that more
yield per acre of crop planted is not a good comparable to a signifi-
cant risk of irreparable health injury. Why? Because health is, for
each of us, an essential condition of effective agency whereas the ben-
efits of increasing the yield of crop per acre are not-for us-mea-
sured in the attainment of an equally essential good. For us, the
benefit of increased agricultural productivity is simply increased
wealth, and the wealth obtained is not an essential condition of any-
one's agency. We should not, therefore, treat risks to health and yield
per acre as commensurable goods and let maximum overall benefit
fix the proper balance between them. Were we poorer, matters might
well be different. The benefit of increased agricultural productivity
might be measured in our ability to provide adequate nutrition to
each member of our society. Adequate nutrition is an essential condi-
tion of effective agency, one comparable to health in its urgency.
Contingent social facts thus make the benefits of increased agricul-
tural productivity not comparable-for us-to significant health risks.
The same combination of a hierarchical conception of human
interests with historically and socially contingent facts is capable of
explaining and justifying the application of safety-based risk regula-
tion to air and water pollution. Air and water, like food, are necessi-
ties. Breathing and drinking, like eating, are unavoidable activities.
Breathing the air and drinking the water should not put our health in
significant peril unless the cost of eliminating that peril threatens our
agency in some comparable way. In an affluent society, when the cost
of eliminating significant health risks from breathing the air and
drinking the water is measured simply in wealth forgone, the cost of
eliminating significant health risk is not comparable to the cost of
bearing such risk. In poorer or less technologically advanced socie-
ties, matters might be different. It might, for example, be impossible
to reduce the risks of air and water pollution to an insignificant level
cost-benefit analysis. The idea here is more general than Rawls's conception of primarygoods. It might, for example, be possible to elaborate it in terms of Amartya Sen's notions
of "functionings" and "capabilities." See generally SEN, supra note 55, at 39-55.
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without seriously impairing the ordinary productive activities that gen-
erate such pollution, and that might make those workers most disad-
vantaged by the pollution worse off rather than better off.
14 4
Safety-based risk regulation, in short, is justified when the costs of
eliminating significant risks of devastating injury are simply not com-
parable to-and fall far short of-the benefits of doing so. When this
is the case, the safe-level standard then fixes the acceptable level of
risk. The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 is correct to require
tolerances for pesticide residue on food products to be set at a level at
which "there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from
aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including all
anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for which there
is reliable information,"'45 even in light of the special susceptibility of
infants and children to harm from toxic substances, 146 if attaining this
level of safety will not impose a burden comparable to a significant
risk of devastating physical injury. When are costs comparable? When
the burden of bearing the precaution necessary to reduce a particular
class of significant risk of devastating injury to the point of insignifi-
cance is of a kind that might outweigh the burden of devastating in-
jury that is the price of the risk. The burden of eliminating all
insignificant risks of devastating injury, for example, is comparable to
the burden of bearing them, because the elimination of all risks re-
quires the elimination of all activity. The elimination of all activity
burdens an essential condition of agency-the freedom to act-even
more than insignificant risk of devastating injury burdens the physical
integrity of the person, another essential condition of human agency.
144. Both the safety and the feasibility norms are especially protective of those most
imperiled by the risks that these norms regulate. While these norms are not strictly analo-
gous to Rawls's difference principle, they are strikingly similar in their solicitude for the
class of those made "worst off" by the risks in question. See generally RAwLs, THEORY, supra
note 12, § 13, at 65. The resemblance is worth remarking on in part because the kinds of
risks under consideration are not wholly comparable to the design of the basic structure of
society in their impacts on the life prospects of every member of society. The subject mat-
ter regulated by these norms is markedly different from the subject matter regulated by the
difference principle. It therefore seems unlikely that the particular arguments for the dif-
ference principle could be extended to justify these norms. It seems likely, though, that
more general reasons of fairness explain and justify the solicitude for the "worst off" shown
by these norms: When the distribution of burdens and benefits is at issue "our attention is
naturally directed first" to the claims of those who bear the greatest burdens, "because if
anyone has reasonable grounds for objecting to the principle it is likely to be them." T.M.
SCANLON, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE: ESSAYS IN PO-
LITICAL PHILOSOPHY 124, 145 (2003). As I have argued, those whose lives are put at signifi-
cant risk of severe, irreparable injury have an urgent claim to protection.
145. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (2)(A) (ii).
146. § 346a(b) (2) (C).
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The presence of comparability thus marks the point at which
tradeoffs begin. Within federal risk regulation, feasibility-based regu-
lation of risks of devastating injury replaces safety-based regulation
when costs are comparable. When are burdens to major, productive
economic activities-the kind governed by both safety- and feasibility-
based risk regulation-comparable to significant risks of devastating
injury? Feasibility-based risk regulation is constructed around an an-
swer to that question: Burdens to ordinary, productive economic ac-
tivities-activities like milling cotton, refining petroleum, and growing
crops-are comparable to significant risks of devastating injury when
they threaten the long-run flourishing of those activities. Feasibility-
based risk regulation supposes that the value realized by the major,
productive economic activities of our society is comparable to, and
generally greater than, significant risk of devastating injury. It is this
claim that we must now explore.
B. Comparable Value and Feasible Risk Reduction
Workplace risks are the primary domain of feasibility-based risk
regulation, OSHA is the primary practitioner of feasibility analysis,
and workers are the primary beneficiaries of the feasibility standard.
Feasibility-based risk regulation as practiced by OSHA presumes that
the productive economic activities to which it applies are sufficiently
valuable that shutting them down would cause greater hardship than
allowing them to continue, when their continuation involves imposing
significant risks of devastating injury that can only be reduced byjeop-
ardizing the long-run survival of those activities. More particularly,
feasibility analysis as practiced by OSHA presumes that shutting the
activity down would work a greater long-run hardship to the workers
the activity endangers than asking those workers to accept significant
risks of devastating injury. The well-being of workers is the natural
focal point for appraising relative hardships, because workers are both
the principal victims of the activities' risks and the principal benefi-
ciaries of feasibility-based risk regulation. Because their lives and their
health are endangered, their claims have a special urgency and a natu-
ral priority. Their claim to greater protection is especially powerful.
There is a strong resemblance between the view that feasibility-
based risk regulation takes of the significant risks of major, productive
activities, and the view that safety-based risk regulation takes of insig-
nificant risk. Feasibility analysis tolerates significant risk when it is the
price of particular major, productive activities. Safety-based risk regu-
lation tolerates insignificant risk as the price of activity itself. Even
under the best of circumstances, safety-based risk regulation supposes
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that a background level of risk of devastating physical injury must be
accepted, because the cost of eliminating that risk is the prohibition
of all activity, and the prohibition of all activity is a cure worse than
the disease. The elimination of all risk of devastating physical injury
paralyzes our lives, impairing our pursuit of valuable ends and activi-
ties more than the background level of risk itself does. Feasibility
analysis applies these ideas in a more particular way. It holds that we
are justified in accepting a level of risk greater than the background
level of risk-a significant level of risk-when our only alternative is to
shut down a valuable activity. The implicit judgment here is that shut-
ting down the particular activities to which the feasibility norm applies
makes those that the activity most endangers worse off, not better off.
1. Feasibility Analysis as Practiced by OSHA.-OSHA's judgments
in The Cotton Dust Case illustrate the application of feasibility analysis
in both its technological and economic aspects and the relation of
feasible risk reduction to safety in some detail. Cotton dust is the pri-
mary cause of byssinosis or "brown lung" disease, a serious, potentially
disabling disease. 4 7 Because exposure to cotton dust is the primary
cause of brown lung disease, the disease is "a distinct occupational
hazard associated with cotton mills." 48 At the time of The Cotton Dust
Case, an estimated one in twelve retired cotton workers suffered from
the most severe grade of byssinosis.' 4 9 The best contemporary studies
of the health effects of prolonged workplace exposure to cotton dust
suggested that the exposure to "lint free cotton dust" could never be
safe at any level higher than 0.2 mg of such dust per cubic meter, or
200 gig/m 5 .15° OSHA concluded that this upper limit of safe exposure
should be used to define the "permissible exposure limit" (PEL) for
147. The Cotton Dust Case, 452 U.S. 490, 495 (1981). Byssinosis is a "continuum ...
disease," categorized into four grades "[k]nown generally as the Schilling classification
grades." Id. at 496 & n.8. These are:
[Grade] 1/2: slight acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity; no evidence of
chronic ventilatory impairment.
[Grade] 1: definite acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity; no evidence of
chronic ventilatory impairment.
[Grade] 2: evidence of slight to moderate irreversible impairment of ventilatory
capacity.
[Grade] 3: evidence of moderate to severe irreversible impairment of ventilatory
capacity.
Id. at 496 n.8. In 1970, an estimated 100,000 employed and retired cotton workers suffered
from the disease, with an estimated 35,000 (or I out of every 12) suffering from grade 3,
the worst and most disabling form of the disease. Id. at 498.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 499-500.
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exposure to cotton dust over the course of an eight-hour workday. 51
Attaining this PEL, however, was not always feasible:
OSHA interpreted the Act to require adoption of the most
stringent standard to protect against material health impair-
ment, bounded only by technological and economic feasibil-
ity. OSHA therefore rejected the industry's alternative
proposal for a PEL of 500 pg/m' in yarn manufacturing, a
proposal which would produce a 25% prevalence of at least
Grade '/2 byssinosis. The agency expressly found the Stan-
dard to be both technologically and economically feasible
based on the evidence in the record as a whole. Although
recognizing that permitted levels of exposure to cotton dust
would still cause some byssinosis, OSHA nevertheless re-
jected the union proposal for a 100 [tg/m 3 PEL because it
was not within the "technological capabilities of the indus-
try." Similarly, OSH1A set PEL's for some segments of the
cotton industry at 500 gtg/m 3 in part because of limitations
of technological feasibility. Finally, the Secretary found that
"engineering dust controls in weaving may not be feasible
even with massive expenditures by the industry," and for that
and other reasons adopted a less stringent PEL of 750 jig/m 3
for weaving and slashing. 52
The "safe" level of 100 jtg/m 3 was thus technologically unattainable,
and as is often the case, the best attainable level-the technologically
feasible level-200 jtg/m 3 , was economically infeasible. Levels as high
as 750 jtg/m 3 were accepted for weaving and slashing-one activity
within the enterprise of milling cotton-because lower levels could
not be achieved even with massive industry expenditures on safety.
The Cotton Dust Case thus makes plain the conception of compara-
bility espoused by the feasibility test and squarely frames the issues
that test raises. Feasibility analysis, as practiced by OSHA, treats the
cessation of an activity as a cost comparable to and (in general)
greater than the cost of bearing a significant risk of devastating injury.
The basic criterion of comparability employed by feasibility analysis is
therefore a localized and more relaxed application of the criterion
employed by safety analysis. Safety analysis views the shutting down of
all activity as a cost sufficient to justify bearing insignificant risk of dev-
astating injury from any given activity. Feasibility analysis considers
the shutting down of major productive activities in our market econ-
151. Id. at 500.
152. Id. at 503-04 (citations omitted).
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omy as a cost sufficient to justify bearing significant risk of devastating
injury from such activities.
By considering the cessation of significant productive activities in
a market economy to be comparable in kind and generally more
costly than a significant risk of devastating injury, feasibility analysis
extends the idea of comparable value to a case in which the instru-
mental, mundane activity of earning a living and generating wealth
justifies bearing a significant risk of devastating injury. Comparing sig-
nificant risks of devastating injury to the termination of economically
productive-but mundane-activities is plainly controversial. If we
picture this tradeoff at the level of an individual life, its merits are
uncertain. Losing a job-the consequence of shutting down some or-
dinary economic activity-does not seem comparable to losing life or
limb. Nor does it seem comparable to suffering a health impairment
that will permanently and severely impair normal functioning and
shorten the span of one's life-typical consequences of serious occu-
pational diseases. We should, it seems, fear devastating injury more
than job loss. We are, after all, more likely to find another job than
another life or limb.
2. Justifying Feasible Risk Reduction.-What is the case for treating
the cessation of a major, productive economic activity as comparable
to a significant risk of devastating injury? The claim to comparability
rests, I believe, on three ideas. First, feasibility-based risk regulation
assumes that the activities to which it applies are ones for whose im-
portance the market has already vouched. It accepts-defers to-the
validity of this prior test of value. Second, feasibility-based risk regula-
tion-like safety-based risk regulation-accepts the importance of so-
cially contingent facts. The major, productive economic activities that
feasibility-based risk regulation accepts as comparable in value to a
significant risk of devastating injury are contingent and historically
transient-but nonetheless terribly important-features of our econ-
omy. Third, feasibility analysis appeals implicitly to the idea that, in
terms of value, the major, productive activities to which it applies are
indistinguishable. The case for shutting down one major productive
activity is therefore a case for shutting down all similar activities. That
price is too high to pay for the elimination of significant risk.
The first of these ideas is that ongoing, productive activities that
flourish in a market economy have significant value. Because they
have passed the market's test of value, we may presume that their over-
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all benefits outweigh their overall costs. 153 Shutting down such activi-
ties therefore removes something of significant value to many
people-workers, consumers, suppliers, shareholders.
The second idea asserts that contingent social facts-accidents of
history, if you like-can embed themselves so deeply in the structure
of our social life that what once might never have taken root can now
only be uprooted at enormous cost. We can readily imagine social
worlds without the activities governed by OSHA-style feasibility analy-
sis-social worlds without cotton clothing or petroleum products. We
know that such social worlds have existed in the past, and we expect a
social world without petroleum products to exist at some point in the
future. Those who have lived and who will live without cotton shirts
or petroleum products surely have not suffered and will not suffer
great hardship-hardship comparable to devastating physical injury-
because they are deprived of the fruits of these activities.
Yet feasibility analysis as practiced by OSHA treats the termina-
tion of activities such as cotton milling and refining petroleum as a
harm both comparable to a significant risk of devastating injury and
generally greater than such a risk. The assumption is that the worlds
in which these activities would not be sorely missed are different social
worlds from our own. Activities such as refining petroleum and mill-
ing cotton are deeply entrenched in our social world. Ending them
abruptly would cause massive, unpredictable dislocation. Shutting
down the activity of refining petroleum, for example, is essentially un-
thinkable. Petroleum products are knit so tightly into the fabric of
our daily lives that we cannot simply decide to do without them with-
out working inconceivable disruption in our lives.
The third idea applies a test of generalization and makes a claim
about the outcome of that test. This criterion parallels and repeats, in
a more localized manner, an important part of the argument for toler-
153. Some readers may be troubled (and rightly so, I believe) by the fact that the under-
lying test of value is essentially a utilitarian or economic one. It is worth noting, however,
that feasibility analysis would proceed in the very same way if we adopted an underlying test
based on fairness. Imagine a social world such as our own except that the workings of the
market economy satisfied the requirements of Rawls's difference principle. We would then
say that the activities in question were valuable not because they had passed a market test
of cost-justification, but because they were part of an economic system that was to the
advantage of all those who participated in it. See RAwLs, THEORY, supra note 12, § 13, at 65.
This situation would give us a different reason to count the shutting down of significant
productive activities in that world as a serious harm-a reason of fairness, not utility.
Should the objection therefore be directed against the conception of mutual advantage
(Pareto superiority) that governs our market economy, rather than against feasibility analy-
sis? I discuss this in the final Part of this Essay.
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ating insignificant risks of devastating physical injury. 154 If a remote
risk of devastating injury is indistinguishable from many other such
risks, fairness requires us to eliminate all such risks if it requires us to
eliminate any of them. If, for example, the risks created by driving to
the movies are indistinguishable from a host of other remote risks cre-
ated by trivial errands, we must eliminate all of these risks if we choose
to eliminate one of them. Eliminating all of these risks is, however,
undesirable. Some very low risk of devastating injury is the price of
activity, and activity is essential to the leading of any worthwhile
human life. The undesirability of eliminating all risk explains andjus-
tifies the otherwise puzzling significance criterion found in both
safety- and feasibility-based risk regulation.
A parallel, but more particular, argument supports the assump-
tion that the shutting down of a productive activity is a disvalue com-
parable to a significant risk of devastating injury. Suppose that we
chose to stop milling cotton or refining petroleum because these ac-
tivities cannot be conducted without imposing significant risks of dev-
astating injury. Fairness would then require us to stop all similar
productive activities-all major, productive activities that cannot be
conducted without imposing significant risks of devastating injury. If
milling cotton and refining petroleum are typical of the class of pro-
ductive activities to which feasibility analysis applies, this result is unac-
ceptable. Perhaps the life prospects of those most endangered by
cotton milling would be better if we eliminated that activity and no
other class of persons would suffer a worse hardship than those most
endangered by cotton milling now do. Perhaps the same is true if we
ceased refining petroleum (although I doubt it), but the more activi-
ties we add to the list, the less persuasive the claim is that we are gain-
ing value, not losing it. Shutting down most of the major productive
activities in our economy would be a harm comparable to bearing a
significant risk of devastating injury. Shutting down most of the major
productive activities in our economy almost certainly would not be to
154. This kind of generalization test is common in ordinary negligence analysis as well.
See, e.g., Grace & Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 168 F. Supp. 344, 349 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (holding
that it would be unreasonable to rule that the defendant should have inspected a graphite
water pipe that had not been inspected in 40 years and that damaged plaintiff's property
when it burst, because the costs of unearthing and inspecting every buried pipe every 2 to 3
years "would be prohibitively expensive and economically unfeasible"); Clinton v. Com-
monwealth Edison Co., 344 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (holding that the plain-
tiffs proposed precaution of requiring the defendant utility to insulate the 7200-volt power
line that electrocuted a 15-year-old boy was unreasonable as a matter of law because it
would be "tantamount to requiring defendants and all who are engaged in the business of
supplying electrical service to insulate all of their lines").
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the advantage of the workers employed by those activities and most
exposed to their risks. 15 5
Insofar as it is correct to claim that the case for ceasing one major
productive activity is a case for shutting down all of them, this is a
persuasive argument. That claim, however, should give us pause. The
argument against shutting down most of society's major productive
activities is an argument of fairness-the workers employed by these
activities would be harmed in the long run by the elimination of these
activities, even though these activities exact a significant toll on the
lives and health of those very workers. Yet the fact that these activities
flourish in our market economy vouches not for their fairness, but for
their efficiency. The major, economically productive activities to
which feasibility-based risk regulation applies flourish in our market
economy, and we may assume that they would not if their costs ex-
ceeded their benefits. The market's test of value is roughly and
loosely utilitarian. Roughly, because actual markets do not work per-
fectly. Loosely, because markets measure value in wealth, and wealth
is not identical to utility. These imperfections, however, are not what
should give us pause. Activities may be net beneficial in market
terms-their economic benefits may exceed their costs-without be-
ing fair in the sense of working to the long-run advantage of those
they most disadvantage. So there is cause for concern: Feasibility-
based risk regulation may realize fairness within boundaries fixed by
efficiency. That this happens would be no surprise to Calabresi: The
Costs of Accidents shows a keen awareness that the market must remain
the default mechanism for making many decisions to permit or pre-
vent accidental injuries.' 56 But this fact presents serious problems for
an argument constructed around the idea of fairness.
155. The Court considered this type of argument in Whitman v. American TruckingAss'ns,
Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 466-67 (2001):
[R]espondents argue ... [that] the economic cost of implementing a very strin-
gent standard might produce health losses sufficient to offset the health gains
achieved in cleaning the air-for example, by closing down whole industries and
thereby impoverishing the workers and consumers dependent upon those indus-
tries. That is unquestionably true, and Congress was unquestionably aware of it.
... Section 110(f)(1) of the [Clean Air Act] permitted the Administrator to waive
the compliance deadline for stationary sources if, inter alia, sufficient control mea-
sures were simply unavailable and "the continued operation of such sources is
essential... to the public health or welfare."
Id. (emphasis added by the Court) (citations omitted).
156. Calabresi notes that "[e]ven if we accepted the notion that informed political deci-
sions are always desirable when nonmoney costs are involved, it would be impossible for us
to make such political decisions in all the myriad situations where a choice among acci-
dent-causing activities has to be made." THE COSTS OF AccIDENTs, supra note 3, at 99; see
also id. at 72 ("[I]t is hard to imagine a society where, somewhere along the line, the mar-
212 [VOL. 64:159
PRICELESSNESS AND LIFE
V. THE ROLE OF THE MARKET: CONTINGENCY AND EFFICIENCY
Feasibility-based risk regulation draws its justification for demand-
ing more than cost-justified precaution from considerations of fair-
ness. It is only fair to ask some to bear significant risk of devastating
injury if the burden of eliminating that significant risk (and the devas-
tation that is its eventual price) is comparable to the burden of bear-
ing it. For the imposition of risks of devastating injury tolerated by
feasibility analysis to be fair, the long-run flourishing of the activities
to which feasibility analysis applies must outweigh the significant risk
of devastating injury that is the price of that flourishing. And here
there is cause for concern.
That concern has two sources. First, feasibility analysis depends
on contingent social facts. It equates the survival of particular produc-
tive economic activities with significant threats to our health and bod-
ily integrity. This equation is jarring: Mortality and physical
vulnerability seem far more fundamental to our agency than do our
dependence on cotton and petroleum. Second, feasible risk regula-
tion accepts a market test for the value of the activities to which it
applies. Feasibility analysis ceases to condemn significant risk of dev-
astating injury when condemnation jeopardizes the long-run vitality of
the productive economic activities on which feasibility analysis is
brought to bear. Feasibility analysis thus counts the continued vitality
of basic productive activities as a value great enough to justify bearing
significant risk of devastating injury. The value of these activities is
thus vouched for by the fact that they prosper in our market economy.
The fear raised by this acceptance of market value is that the market
vouches not for fairness but for efficiency, for net social benefit in the
sense of wealth maximization, and for mutual advantage in the sense
of Pareto superiority. Fairness, however, is quite a different matter
from efficiency.
The contingent character of the activities whose flourishing is
counted comparable to and greater than significant risk of devastating
injury, and the fact that the flourishing of these activities in a market
economy warrants only their efficiency, both present substantial chal-
lenges to feasibility analysis. Let us consider them in turn.
ket deterrence approach to primary accident control would not be significant."); id. at 107-
09 (arguing that the market is often by far the cheapest factfinding device available to assist
in making judgments on how to deal with accidents).
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A. Comparability and Contingent Social Facts
The dependence of feasibility analysis on contingent social facts
raises the worry that we are sacrificing an essential condition of effec-
tive agency for inessential gains. Our mortality and vulnerability are
fundamental facts about us. Physical vulnerability and mortality have
always characterized human beings. In contrast, the importance to us
of various activities whose elimination would remove significant risks
of devastating injury-milling cotton or refining petroleum-depends
on facts much less fundamental than having vulnerable bodies and
being mortal. Indeed, our attachment to any particular activity is
much more contingent than our need for physical health and bodily
integrity and our vulnerability to devastating injury. The socially con-
tingent character of the particular activities to which we are attached
might, then, be proof that we can and should learn to live without
them. We cannot live decent lives with shattered bodies, but we can
live decent lives without cotton shirts or private passenger automo-
biles. The importance of keeping our bodies intact, coupled with the
contingent character of our dependence on the activities that endan-
ger us, might be reason for us to criticize these activities as less impor-
tant than physical integrity, not reason to equate them with physical
integrity. Bodily integrity is a precondition of rational agency in a way
that cotton shirts are not. Its preservation ought, therefore, take pri-
ority over the flourishing of historically particular, socially contingent
activities.
This argument, though, proves too much. Our need for any par-
ticular activity may not be as deep as our need for bodily integrity, but
our need for activities that are socially contingent and historically
transitory is as deep. It is through such activities-and only through
such activities-that we sustain other conditions of rational agency
and realize the diversity of values that give rational agency its point.
Unless we believe that we can reproduce ourselves and realize an
equivalent range of values through a set of activities that do not create
a significant risk of devastating injury, we cannot take the shutting
down of significantly risky activities lightly simply because each activity
that we might shut down is socially contingent and historically particu-
lar. Feasibility analysis therefore cannot be faulted simply because it
considers the continued flourishing of particular, historically contin-
gent activities to be a value great enough to trump significant risk of
devastating injury. If it is to be faulted, it must be faulted for the par-
ticular test of value it employs and, through that test, for the particular
activities it considers comparable. The correct concern is not that fea-
sible risk reduction counts contingent activities comparable to signifi-
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cant risk of devastating injury, but that it counts any activity that
flourishes in a market economy as valuable enough to justify imposing
significant risk of devastating injury.
B. Feasibility and Efficiency
The difficulty, of course, is that flourishing in a market economy
vouches not for the fairness of an activity, but for its efficiency. In
general, it is only fair to impose a significant risk of devastating injury
on workers in an industry when that risk cannot be reduced to insig-
nificance without imposing a comparable burden on some other class
of persons, and when the continued flourishing of the activity is to the
long-run advantage of the workers it burdens. By contrast, an activity
is efficient when it makes the pie larger-when it generates wealth,
expanding the total resources at society's disposal. Efficient activities
are to the advantage of those who participate in them only in a lim-
ited, Pareto sense. As long as those who participate in efficient activi-
ties do so voluntarily (and rationally and with adequate information),
they are advantaged in the sense that taking part in those activities
makes them better off than they would be had they refused to partici-
pate. In the cases that are the objects of our concern, Pareto superior-
ity means that workers are better off accepting the jobs they accept
than they would be if they did not accept those jobs, notwithstanding
the significant risks those jobs pose.
Pareto superiority guarantees advantage against the preexisting
background of entitlements and opportunities, but it does not guaran-
tee fairness. A transaction can be Pareto superior for a party in a poor
bargaining position, but still unfair. The deal struck may give the
party with superior bargaining power an unjust share of the coopera-
tive surplus. A Pareto-superior deal may give the party with superior
bargaining power a share of the cooperative surplus that the party
would not agree to were they to be placed behind a "veil of ignorance"
and told to strike a deal that they would be prepared to honor no
matter whose shoes they turned out to occupy. Where risk of devastat-
ing injury is involved, a Pareto-superior transaction may burden the
weaker party with an unfair risk-a significant risk that might be elimi-
nated without making either that party or anyone else bear a compa-
rable hardship. Pareto-superior transactions may be unfair because
they arise within a setting of unfair background conditions, inequali-
ties, and entitlements. Inequalities of power may make it rational for
someone in a weaker position to enter into a transaction on particular
terms, but they do not make those terms reasonable-they do not
make those terms fair. Fair (or reasonable) terms are terms that the
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parties would agree to if they ignored their particular advantages and
disadvantages and sought only to agree to terms that neither party
could reasonably reject. 15 7 Pareto-superior transactions may be ones
that would never meet this test of unforced agreement. They may ex-
press not unforced agreement, but rather the coercive force of preex-
isting inequalities in knowledge, wealth, bargaining power, and so on.
The fact that activities flourish in a market economy thus guarantees
that they are mutually advantageous in a Pareto sense (roughly speak-
ing, at least), but it does not vouch for their fairness. For Pareto-supe-
rior transactions to be fair, the pre-existing entitlements on which
they improve must themselves be fair.
C. Valuing Activities: Feasibility, Fairness, and the Market
We do, then, have reason to worry about the way in which a mar-
ket test of value vouches for the value of the activities governed by
feasible risk reduction. The market vouches for the efficiency of the
activities that flourish within it, not for their fairness. The efficiency
of market transactions is assured by their being mutually advanta-
geous (Pareto superior) for market actors, but the fairness of market
transactions is not. The fairness of market transactions depends on
the institutional framework within which those transactions take
place. Market transactions are generally fair when they take place
against ajust background-against ajust (or fair) assignment of initial
rights and entitlements and a just distribution of resources, both gov-
erned over time by principles that prevent initially fair starting points
from deteriorating into unfair distributions of rights and resources. It
is the sustained presence of "background justice" that vouches for the
fairness of individual transactions."a 8 In the absence of background
justice, nothing guarantees the fairness of particular Pareto-superior
transactions, or particular efficient activities. When feasibility analysis
accepts the fact of an activity's flourishing in the marketplace as proof
that the activity is valuable enough to justify bearing a significant risk
of injury, it accepts efficiency as a limit on fairness.
The fact that efficiency limits the critical bite of fairness in this
way is cause for concern. Feasible risk reduction, it seems, should
press the claims of fairness further and ask if the disappearance of an
activity would make the workers endangered by its significant risks bet-
157. On "reasonable rejection," see SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 53, at 194-97,
203-18, 223-31.
158. SeeJOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT §§ 14-15, at 50-55 (Erin Kelly
ed., 2001) [hereinafter JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS] (describing background justice and its rela-
tionship to the basic structure of a system of social cooperation).
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ter off, without imposing a comparable disadvantage on another class
of persons affected by the activity. If an activity flunks that test, it
should be subjected to the more stringent demands of the safety
standard.
It is easy enough to imagine how an ideal legislator might fix the
respective domains of the safety and feasibility norms, assigning those
activities whose presence in the world is not sufficiently valuable to
justify bearing significant risk of devastating injury to the safety norm,
and those whose presence is sufficiently valuable to justify bearing
such risks to the feasibility norm. One may likewise imagine judges
and regulators appraising the value of various activities, and condemn-
ing those activities whose irreducible risks are not worth their benefits.
Even so, Calabresi seems perceptively and profoundly correct to con-
tend that some decisions about lives and safety must be left in the
hands of the market. The enterprise of asking judges and legislators
to evaluate every single activity is, in the end, neither credible or com-
pelling. It demands too much of judges and legislators. The lesson
here, however, is not that efficiency must trump fairness but that fair-
ness in risk imposition cannot be obtained solely by fair norms of acci-
dent law. It must be attained in part by embedding market processes
within a larger framework of just entitlements and procedures.
The fairness of market transactions, and of the activities that
emerge from them, depends principally on the establishment of what
I have been calling "background justice." In order for markets to op-
erate fairly, initial entitlements must be fixed properly, and the opera-
tion of the market must itself be regulated to maintain this
background justice. Institutions designed to make and apply accident
law are not ideally equipped to establish and maintain background
justice. Their interventions in market activities are, almost inevitably,
bound to be piecemeal and ad hoc. They target particular unfair ac-
tivities, not the deeper conditions that allow those activities to flour-
ish. To be sure, the institutions of accident law have a role to play in
the construction of a just basic structure of society. The appropriate
specification of the domains of safety, feasibility, and cost-justified1"9
risk reduction is likely part of a just basic structure, but surely not the
whole of it. The allocation of basic rights and the distribution of
wealth, income, and property are also essential parts of it. The lion's
159. Taking only the costjustified level of precaution is proper when the harm done is
repairable, so that redistribution after the fact of injury can distribute the burdens and
benefits of risky activity fairly. In this case, it makes sense to proceed by maximizing the
size of the pie and redistributing to achieve fairness thereafter. See KEETON ET AL.,
TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 62, at 20-7.
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share of the task of ensuring that only fair activities flourish in a mar-
ket economy may best be shouldered, then, by those institutions
charged with ensuring the justice of the basic structure.
The best way to address the problem of unjust activities, in other
words, might be indirectly, not directly. In light of the conception of
fairness we have embraced, it may not be best to extend the practice
of feasibility analysis so that it regularly appraises the value of the activ-
ities whose risks are at issue. Instead, it may be best to seek ajust basic
structure. The existence of such a structure would ensure, for the
most part, that the activities flourishing within it are fair. Imagine, for
example, a social world such as our own, except that the workings of
the market economy satisfied a principle of fairness.16 ° The economic
activities that flourished in such a social world would be counted fair
not because they had passed a market test of cost-justification, but be-
cause they arose out of a fair background situation through procedur-
ally fair transactions and flourished in an economic system governed
by principles ofjustice that ensured that it worked to the advantage of
all those who participated in it-even those it most disadvantaged.
16 1
In this social world, we would have a reason of fairness to count the
shutting down of major productive activities a grave injury, compara-
ble to a significant risk of devastating harm. In this world, feasible risk
reduction might proceed in essentially the way that it proceeds in our
world, but because it would operate against a different background, its
assumption that the survival of major productive activities is a value
great enough to justify bearing a significant risk of devastating harm
would stand on firmer footing.
Until such a social world comes into existence, however, the con-
ceptions of fairness expressed by the norms of feasible and safe pre-
caution will be framed and limited by the logic of market efficiency.
The legal doctrine implementing the safety and feasibility norms thus
shows that our law of accidents includes principles of risk regulation
that prescribe more than efficient precaution against risk to human
life. These norms give practical expression to the moral conviction
that life is a "pearl beyond all price." But the limiting of the feasibility
160. Rawls's difference principle is one such principle. See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note
12, § 13, at 65 ("The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the
more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those
less fortunate.").
161. See RAwLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS, supra note 158, § 14, at 50-52 (noting that "[tihe
rules of background institutions required by the two principles ofjustice ... are essential
... to make it likely that economic and social inequalities contribute in an effective way to
the general good or, more exactly, to the benefit of the least-advantaged members of
society").
[VOL. 64:159
2005] PRICELESSNESS AND LIFE 219
norm by the market also confirms the acuity of Calabresi's observa-
tions in Costs about the robustness of the market as a mechanism for
valuing accidents and accident-causing activities.
